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AN AMERICAN TRADITION
The thunder stopped. Silence replaced the roar of guns. At
its core, the cloud of carbon haze clung to the ground. On its
edges, the smoke thinned, and the blanket of snow that
stretched to the horizon reemerged. Gradually, the cover of
smoke lifted, revealing the wrath of the gunfire. Lying near
where the Army had ordered them to congregate, hundreds of
bodies, wrapped in tattered clothing, rested in small pools of
blood-soaked snow. The Ghost Dance at Wounded Knee had
ended.
During the 1989-90 term, the United States Supreme Court
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ruled in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
v. Smith' that the first amendment does not protect from criminal
sanctions the sacramental ingestion of peyote during Native Amer-
ican Church ceremonies, even though the ritual is integral to the
practice of the religion.2 In the process of making this decision, the
Court fabricated a novel free exercise approach. Compared to the
Wounded Knee Massacre in 1890, the Court's ruling in Smith ap-
pears relatively innocuous: rather than unleashing military fire-
power to eradicate the Ghost Dance Religion as was done in 1890,
100 years later the Court provided a far more humane and rea-
soned process for persecuting Native Americans in the exercise of
their religion. Yet, as Native Americans learned long ago, due pro-
cess does not ensure justice because the ethnocentrism and dis-
crimination that characterized America's historic treatment of In-
dians persist today.
Smith reflects this persistence, even though the critical re-
sponse to Smith will undoubtedly fixate on its implications for free
exercise doctrine. While casting an ominous shadow over the fu-
ture of free exercise rights, Smith's disregard for Native American
religion should not be glossed over in the haste to dissect the free
exercise consequences that Smith portends. Focusing on Smith as
an example of America's religious persecution of Native Americans
does not discount its future implications as a revision of free exer-
cise doctrine. Indeed, viewing Smith as a denial of American Indi-
ans' free exercise rights reveals the type of future free exercise
abridgment that this decision harbors.
Although our nation professes to cherish its first amendment-
enshrined religious liberty, our society persistently denies this
right to America's original inhabitants. Historically, the religious
persecution of American Indians is undisputed. The massacre at
Wounded Knee in 1890 provides the most sensational and tragic
illustration of this persecution. Apparently, we have never learned
from this tragedy, as the government continues to deny religious
freedom to Native Americans today. Recently, this denial has also
surfaced in the application of the first amendment to the sacred
site cases, in which courts repeatedly deny the asserted free exer-
cise rights of American Indians by permitting the development of
their sacred lands.
The legal system's role in the present denial of the religious
freedom of Native Americans has not gone unnoticed. Many com-
1. 110 S. Ct. 1595, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990).
2. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1599.
1991]
3
Rhodes: AN AMERICAN TRADITION: THE RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION OF NATIVE AMERICANS
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1991
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
mentators have argued that sacred site decisions abridge the free
exercise rights of American Indians.' Even Congress has sympa-
thized with the plight of Indians, passing the American Indian Re-
ligious Freedom Act in 1978." However, the Supreme Court has in-
terpreted this Act as having no legal consequence.5 As a result,
courts continue to deny the free exercise claims of American Indi-
ans despite the sentiments of Congress.
Ethnocentrism6 is at the root of this denial, as it has been in
the past. An empowering sense of cultural superiority encouraged
Europeans to mount a war of cultural genocide against American
Indians, nearly exterminating them in the process. Wounded Knee
represents the nadir of the white man's inhumanity and religious
intolerance. European immigrants, limited by their own religious
experience, misunderstood the religious nature of the Ghost Dance
and misinterpreted this messianic religion as a militaristic upris-
ing.7 Contemporary attitudes have changed little from the ethno-
centrism that has historically influenced our treatment of Ameri-
can Indians. As a result, we continue in 1990, the 100th
anniversary of Wounded Knee, to deny Native Americans the reli-
gious freedom that the Constitution guarantees.'
The courts do not understand the nature of Indian religious
beliefs because most judges are confined intellectually by Judeo-
Christian notions of what constitutes a religion. This bias is re-
flected in the judicially constructed legal doctrines for determining
the constitutional validity of religious claims; because these doc-
3. Within the domain of legal periodicals, several journals have published articles that
review the denial of religious freedom to Native Americans. See infra notes 99, 127, 131,
133, 158.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).
5. See, e.g., Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Protec-
tive Association, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988).
Nowhere in the law is there so much as a hint of any intent to create a cause of
action or any judicially enforceable individual rights.
... Representative Udall [sponsor of the bill] emphasized that the bill would
not "confer special religious rights on Indians," would "not change any existing
State or Federal law," and in fact "has no teeth in it."
Id. (citations omitted). But see, Note, The First Amendment and the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act, 71 IOWA L. REv. 869 (1986)(arguing that the Act should be instru-
mental in vindicating Native American sacred site claims).
6. Ethnocentrism has been defined as "viewing other peoples ways of life in terms of
one's own cultural assumptions, customs, and values." R. KEEsING, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY
511 (1981).
7. This mistake was made despite the historic example of the Romans persecuting
another messianic religion in Palenstine, circa 30 to 35 A.D.
8. The pertinent part of the first amendment states, "Congress shall make no law re-
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trines are framed in Western concepts of religiosity, they are preju-
dicial to the non-Western religions of Native Americans. Similarly,
courts are unwilling to recognize the free exercise rights of Ameri-
can Indians whenever this recognition would impose substantial
costs on the government, suggesting that it is not the religious lib-
erty of Native Americans that is instrumental in deciding Indians'
free exercise claims, but rather the cost to the government of in-
dulging this liberty.
In order to understand the religious basis of American Indi-
ans' free exercise claims, one must appreciate the religions of Na-
tive Americans. Part I of this article will explain the distinctive
religious beliefs of American Indians. Part II will illustrate the his-
torical denial of Indians' religious freedom by reliving the violent
death of the Ghost Dance at Wounded Knee. In Part III, an analy-
sis of recent case law will reveal the legal perpetuation of this de-
nial. Part IV will propose a doctrinal system for resolving sacred
site claims. Finally, Part V will outline recommendations for pro-
tecting Native Americans' religious rights.
I. A NATIVE AMERICAN TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION To INDIAN
RELIGIONS
Before examining the violent suppression of Indian religious
activity at Wounded Knee and the judiciary's perpetuation of this
denial of religious freedom today, it is necessary to understand Na-
tive American religion. Without such an understanding, it is diffi-
cult to comprehend the free exercise rights that contemporary In-
dians have recently asserted in the courts. Reliance on Western
conventions, such as the English language and the Judeo-Christian
conception of religion, to explain the spirituality of American Indi-
ans is inherently problematic. However, only when one experiences
these linguistic and conceptual difficulties can one begin to glimpse
into the world of the American Indian. This overview is intended
to convey a sense of the difference between Native Americans' con-
ceptions of religion and the typical Western understanding of reli-
gion. Consequently, this overview will not catalogue the diverse re-
ligious beliefs and practices of America's original human
inhabitants. Nonetheless, one must be careful not to ignore the di-
versity of traditional American Indian religions. Ethnological illus-
trations will demonstrate that, despite this acknowledged diversity,
the philosophy and core beliefs behind the various tribal religions
traditionally were and today remain remarkably similar. Exper-
iencing this foreign conception of religion is the first step in under-
standing how our society continues the religious persecution of
1991]
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American Indians.
A. The Traditional "Oneness of Indian Life"
In their traditional languages, Native Americans have no word
for religion.9 This absence is very revealing. Unlike the Western
world, which isolates religion as a discrete aspect of social and in-
dividual life, religion permeates the lives of American Indians.
The area of worship cannot be delineated from social, political,
cultur[al], and other areas of Indian life-style, including his gen-
eral outlook upon economic and resource development. . .
[W]orship is . . . an integral part of the Indian way of life and
culture which cannot be separated from the whole. This oneness
of Indian life seems to be the basic difference between the Indian
and non-Indians of a dominant society.10
This Weltanschauung1 contrasts with the Western mentality that
goes to great lengths to separate the sacred from the profane. In-
deed, no institution better demonstrates this Western commitment
than the law. 2
The "oneness of Indian life" implicates more than Native
Americans' cognitive structuring of social reality. For Indians, not
only can cultural manifestations not be discretely categorized, but
neither can the many life forms that populate the earth. From the
perspective of American Indians, humans are merely one of many
beings, and certainly are not the paramount being that Western
culture glorifies. A Sioux medicine man prefaced his life story with
an emphasis on the oneness of creation:
It is the story of all life that is holy and is good to tell, and of
us two-leggeds sharing in it with the four-leggeds and the wings of
the air and all green things; for these are children of one mother
and their father is one Spirit.3
This perception rejects the anthropocentric view that characterizes
Western thought and religion.
9. A. HULTKRANTZ, THE RELIGIONS OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS 9 (1967).
10. American Indian Religious Freedom: Hearings on S.J. Res. 102, Before the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 86-87 (1978)(statement of
Barney Old Coyote, Crow Tribe, Montana).
11. Literally translated from German, Weltanschauung means "worldview." WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2596 (1963).
12. The law reflects this effort in many ways, with perhaps its attempt to separate
religion from the public sphere being the most striking example of this commitment.
Thomas Jefferson asserted that the first amendment raised "a wall of separation between
Church and State." M. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEw NATION: A BIOGRAPHY
712 (1970).
13. BLACK ELK & J. NEIHARDT, BLACK ELK SPEAKS 1 (1932).
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Rather than viewing the earth and its creatures as objects to
be harnessed and exploited, Indians consider them equal partners
in the enterprise of life. "In [their] mind, nature is not something
apart from [them]."1 As one of earth's many life forms, Indians
perceive an interdependency between life forms that escapes the
Western mind. This feeling of interdependency influenced their
traditional utilization of resources.
When we killed a buffalo, we knew what we were doing. We
apologized to his spirit, tried to make him understand why we did
it, honoring with a prayer the bones of those who gave their flesh
to keep us alive, praying for their return, praying for the life of
our brothers, the buffalo nation, as well as for our own people.' 5
Another Sioux shared a similar relationship with the earth's many
beings:
Kinship with all creatures of the earth, sky and water was a
real and active principle. For the animal and bird world there ex-
isted a brotherly feeling that kept the Lakota safe among them
and so close did some of the Lakotas come to their feathered and
furred friends that in true brotherhood they spoke a common
tongue. 6
B. A Tradition of Interdependency and Stewardship
A consequence of this perception of the interdependency of
living things is the Indian notion of stewardship. Native Americans
perceive themselves as caretakers of the earth, not as developers.
This notion of stewardship permeates Native American religions
throughout the continent. For instance, Hopi religious leaders con-
sider their stewardship as vital to the preservation of life:
Hopis are the caretakers of all the world, for all mankind. Hopi
lands extend all over the continents from sea to sea. But the
lands at the sacred center are the key to life. By caring for these
lands in the Hopi way, in accordance with instructions from the
Great Spirit, we keep the rest of the world in balance.' 7
Over a thousand miles to the north, an Assiniboin chief expressed
a similar duty to protect the earth:
14. Momaday, Native American Attitudes to the Environment, in SEEING WITH A NA-
TIVE EYE 84 (1976).
15. J. LAME DEER & R. ERDOES, LAME DEER, SEEKER OF VISIONS 122 (1972).
16. Luther Standing Bear, quoted in T. McLUHAN, TOUCH THE EARTH 6 (1971).
17. Statement of Hopi Religious Leaders, Appendix to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
at 27a-28a, Susenkewa v. Kleppe, 425 U.S. 903 (1976)(No. 75-844), denying cert. to
Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1975)..
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We believe that the Creator made everything beautiful in his
time. We believe that we must be good stewards of the Creator
and not destroy nor mar His works of creation. We look upon
stewardship not only in terms of money and the profit of a hun-
dredfold, but in those of respect for the beauty of the land and of
life in harmony with the succession of the seasons, so that the
voices of all living things can be heard and continue to live and
dwell among us. If an area is destroyed, marred, or polluted, my
people say, the spirits will leave the area. If pollution continues
not only animals, birds, and plant life will disappear, but the spir-
its will also leave. This is one of the greatest concerns of Indian
people.' 8
Such notions of stewardship are not a twentieth century phenome-
non. In 1855, a Cayuse Indian hesitated to sign a treaty relinquish-
ing part of present-day Oregon and Washington to the government
because he felt that innumerable living beings were not repre-
sented in the transaction.
I wonder if the ground has anything to say? I wonder if the
ground is listening to what is said? I wonder if the ground would
come alive and what is on it? Though I hear what the ground
says. The ground says, It is the Great Spirit that placed me here.
The Great Spirit tells me to take care of the Indians, to feed
them aright. The Great Spirit appointed the roots to feed the In-
dians on. The water says the same thing. The Great Spirit directs
me, Feed the Indians well. The grass says the same thing, Feed
the Indians well. The ground, water and grass say, The Great
Spirit has given us our names. We have these names and hold
these names. The ground says, The Great Spirit has placed me
here to produce all that grows on me, trees and fruit. The same
way the ground says, It was from me man was made. The Great
Spirit, in placing men on the earth, desired them to take good
care of the ground and to do each other no harm."9
Not only do these words express the Native American sense of
stewardship, they also vividly illustrate the American Indian per-
ception of the interdependency of living things.
As the quoted passages suggest, personification of the land is
integral to the Native American perception of and relationship
with the earth, and indeed, with all forms of life. "Other living
things are not regarded as insensitive species. Rather they are 'peo-
ples' in the same manner as the various tribes of men are peo-
18. J. SNOW, THESE MOUNTAINS ARE OUR SACRED PLACES 145 (1977).
19. Young Chief, quoted in T. MCLUHAN, supra note 16, at 8.
[Vol. 52
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ples. ' 20 Because all of life is animated, Indians learn from various
life forms.
Did you know that trees talk? Well they do. They talk to
each other, and they'll talk to you if you listen. Trouble is, white
people don't listen. They never learned to listen to the Indians so
I don't suppose they'll listen to other voices in nature. But I have
learned a lot from trees: sometimes about the weather, sometimes
about animals, sometimes about the Great Spirit.2 1
The animated and life-sustaining traits of land make the relation-
ship of a particular people with a particular land "the primary the-
sis of tribal religions. ' 22 In return, this relationship inspires Native
Americans' self-identities as stewards and encourages ecological
harmony and not exploitive development.
The White people never cared for land or deer or bear. When we
Indians kill meat, we eat it all up. When we dig roots we make
little holes. When we built houses, we make little holes. When we
burn grass for grasshoppers, we don't ruin things. We shake down
acorns and pinenuts. We don't chop down the trees. We only use
dead wood. But the White people plow up the ground, pull down
the trees, kill everything. The tree says, "Don't. I am sore. Don't
hurt me." But they chop it down and cut it up. The spirit of the
land hates them. They blast out trees and stir it up to its depths.
They saw up the trees. That hurts them. The Indians never hurt
anything, but the White people destroy all.2
C. American Indian Spirituality and Traditional Sacred Lands
The land, its birds and animals, trees and grasses, streams and
lakes, valleys and mountains, winds and breezes, and boulders and
stones, are all relatives of the American Indians. These relation-
ships have a history, as reflected in the myths of the Indians.2 4 It is
this history and the life-sustaining gifts of these beings that make
particular land sacred to particular tribes.
Every part of this soil is sacred in the estimation of my people.
Every hillside, every valley, every plain and grove, has been hal-
lowed by some sad or happy event in days long vanished... the
very dust upon which you now stand responds more lovingly to
their footsteps than to yours, because it is rich with the dust of
20. V. DELORIA, GOD IS RED 103 (1973).
21. Walking Buffalo, quoted in T. McLUHAN, supra note 16, at 23.
22. V. DELORIA, supra note 20, at 269-70.
23. Words of an old Wintu Indian, quoted in T. McLUHAN, supra note 16, at 15.
24. Numerous books are dedicated to preserving the myths of Native Americans. For
an illustrative example, see P. BULLCHILD, THE SUN CAME DOWN (1985).
1991]
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our ancestors and our bare feet are conscious of the sympathetic
touch .... 25
Chief Seattle's monumental words reveal the sanctity of tribal
lands to Native Americans. Similar passion inspires sacred site liti-
gation today. Implicit in Chief Seattle's testimony is the pervasive
spirituality that defines the lives of Native Americans. This spiri-
tuality touches every aspect of Indian life. As an Osage explained,
All life is wakan. 6 So also is everything which exhibits power,
whether in action, as the winds and drifting clouds, or in passive
endurance, as the boulder by the wayside. For even the common-
est sticks and stones have a spiritual essence which must be
reverenced as a manifestation of the all pervading mysterious
power that fills the universe.2 7
Sacred site claims arise when the spiritual and interdependent re-
lationship of Native Americans with all living things, including
land, is threatened by development. This relationship is at the core
of Indian religions; it defines the identities of Native Americans.
Sacred site litigation aims to preserve and protect such religious
passions. While Native Americans share a religious relationship
with all of their historic lands, they have not brought suits to halt
development of just any public lands. Instead, as the label "sacred
site" suggests, the Indians have restricted their protests to devel-
opment of lands that are sacred to the tribe. Presumably, the first
amendment protects such religious beliefs from government
interference.
D. Religion and the Preservation of Traditional Native
American Culture
Preserving Native Americans' freedom of religion is of more
than constitutional significance. It is a matter of cultural survival.
As the American Indian Religious Freedom Act acknowledged,
"[T]he religious practices of the American Indian ... are an inte-
gral part of their culture, tradition and heritage, such practices
forming the basis of Indian identity and value systems. 28 Histori-
25. Chief Seattle, quoted in AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, UNCOMMON CON-
TROVERSY: FISHING RIGHTS OF THE MUCKLESHOOT, PUYALLUP, AND NISQUALLY INDIANS 31
(1970).
26. Wakan, a word from the Siouan language, is difficult to translate into English. In a
dictionary of the Dakota language, wakan in its noun form is defined as "a spirit, something
consecrated" and in its adjective form as "spiritual, sacred, consecrated, wonderful, incom-
prehensible, mysterious." See 2 HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIANS 897 (F. Hodge ed. 1968).
27. Frances LaFlesche, quoted in R. UNDERHILL, RED MAN'S RELIGION 21 (1965).
28. American Indian Religious Freedom Act. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 1978 U.S. CODE
[Vol. 52
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cally, the government has acted on this knowledge by suppressing
the religious freedom of American Indians; the government has as-
saulted Indian religious beliefs with the goal of gutting Native
American cultures and thereby hastening assimilation into main-
stream society.
Despite its persistence, the government has not yet destroyed
the spirituality of Native Americans. However, the assault contin-
ues today as the development of land sacred to Indians continues.
The current assault on Native American religions is less deliberate
than in the past: today, we insult Native American religions, not
with the instrumental purpose of destroying their culture, but with
the result of denying them religious freedom because the govern-
ment and the courts (as well as the population that supports these
institutions) are unable to understand or unwilling to acknowledge
the Indians' religious relationship with their sacred lands.
Native Americans certainly recognize the government's land
development proposals as a continuation of historic injustice, and
fear that if their religions are destroyed, their cultures will
dissipate:
"[I]n the long run if the expansion [of the ski resort on national
forest land] is permitted, we will not be able successfully to teach
our people that this is a sacred place. If the ski resort remains or
is expanded, our people will not accept the view that this is the
sacred Home of the Kachinas. The basis of our existence as a so-
ciety will become a mere fairy tale to our people. If our people no
longer possess this long-held belief and way of life .... [this will
have] a direct and negative impact upon our religious practices..
. The destruction of these practices will also destroy our present
way of life and culture."29
By denying sacred site claims, courts are ignoring, or at best
marginalizing, this destructive aspect of the development of public
land. Courts frequently inflict damage without even recognizing
the Indian claims as presenting constitutionally valid challenges.
Somehow, Native American religious emphasis on a pervasive spir-
ituality defies the judiciary's notion of religion.
The distinctive nature of Native American religions, or more
precisely the Indians' Weltanschauungen, could be explored and
unfolded in far greater detail.30 For the purposes of this paper, the
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92 Stat.) 469 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988)).
29. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 740 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(quoting "Narrative Direct
Testimony" of Abbott Sekaquaptewa, then-chairman of the Hopi tribe), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1056 (1984).
30. See, e.g., V. DELORIA, supra note 20; A. HULTKRANTZ, supra note 9; BELIEF AND
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following passage adequately suggests the differing reality exper-
ienced by Native Americans.
[Knowledge] has taught us that the world is differently de-
fined in different places. It is not only that people have different
customs; it is not only that people believe in different gods and
expect different post-mortem fates. It is, rather, that the worlds
of different peoples have different shapes' The very metaphysical
presuppositions differ: space does not conform to Euclidean ge-
ometry, time does not form a continuous unidirectional flow, cau-
sation does not conform to Aristotelian logic, man is not differen-
tiated from non-man or life from death, as in our world.31
II. A MISUNDERSTOOD TRADITION: THE GHOST DANCE AND THE
WOUNDED KNEE MASSACRE
A. Lakota Cultural Traditions
Rising to prominence circa 1700 and flourishing for a century
and a half, the Sioux lived the horseback-riding, gun-toting, buf-
falo-chasing, war bonnet-wearing, peace pipe-smoking life that
Hollywood made famous. This 150-year period was the golden age
of Plains Indian culture, and the Sioux epitomized this archetypal
life.
Ironically, the cultural contacts that stimulated this blossom-
ing were the same forces that led to the demise of classic Plains
Indian culture. Without the infusion of guns from the French trad-
ers of the Great Lakes region, and more importantly, horses from
the Spanish conquistadors of the Southwest, this classic culture
would not have developed. Indeed, prior to the European invasion
of the New World, the Sioux were a woodlands and prairie people,
living amidst lakes and forests near the headwaters of the Missis-
sippi. As the French began to exploit the resources of the Great
Lakes area, however, they introduced firearms to the Sioux's bitter
enemies, the Ojibwa,-3 who used the new weapons to drive the
Sioux westward onto the Great Plains. The Sioux who drifted far-
thest onto the Plains called themselves Lakota, meaning "friends"
or "allies."
By the nineteenth century, the Lakota homeland encompassed
an area larger than the states of New York and Pennsylvania corn-
WORSHIP IN NATIVE NORTH AMERICA (1981); SEEING WITH A NATIVE EYE (1976).
31. Goldschmidt, Foreword to C. CASTANEDA, THE TEACHINGS OF DON JUAN: A YAQUI
WAY OF KNOWLEDGE at vii (1968).
32. Derived from Ojibwa nomenclature, the word "Sioux" means "snake" or "enemy."
E. SCHUSKY, THE FORGOTTEN SIOUX 12 (1975).
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bined, ranging from the South Dakota segment of the Missouri
River to the Big Horn Mountains of Wyoming, and from the North
Platte River of Nebraska to the Cannon Ball River of North Da-
kota. However, just as Lakota culture grew to dominate this geo-
graphic area, the pressure of European expansion from the East
began to mount. As a result, the golden age of Lakota culture was
remarkably short-lived. By 1868 the Lakota agreed to confine
themselves to a reservation. The Great Sioux Reservation, as it was
known, encompassed all of the present state of South Dakota west
of the Missouri River.
In 1874 gold was discovered in the Black Hills of western
South Dakota, prompting the government to offer to purchase the
Hills from the Lakota. The Lakota refused and, in retaliation, the
government announced that it would strictly police the boundaries
of the Great Sioux Reservation to keep the Lakota on reservation
land. The Treaty of 1868 had granted the Lakota the right to oc-
cupy unceded territory to the west of the South Dakota reserva-
tion, in what is today eastern Montana and Wyoming. Now, how-
ever, the government pledged to deploy military force to keep the
Indians out of this unceded territory. When the army ventured
into the unceded territory to pressure the Indians to return to
their reservation, the Lakota (and several other tribes) objected to
the government's interpretation of the Treaty of 1868, and the
Battle of Little Big Horn ensued.33 Shocked by the savagery of the
Indians at Little Big Horn, an outraged Congress demanded that
the Lakota either vacate the Black Hills and the unceded territory
or cease receiving government rations. Victorious on the battlefield
but impotent in the Capitol, the Lakota sold their land."'
Coinciding with this reduction in freedom was the near exter-
mination of the Lakota's staff of life, the buffalo. 5 The combina-
tion of these two events created an increasingly disintegrated and
frustrated reservation life for the Lakota during the 1880s. This
frustration culminated in the division of the already reduced Great
Sioux Reservation into six smaller reservations: a sacrifice of nine
million acres of land to appease the flood of white immigrants.
33. R. UTLEY, THE LAST DAYS OF THE Sioux NATION 18 (1963). This brief synopsis of
the Sioux has been compiled from several sources. For a general overview of this period in
Indian history, see E. SCHUSKY, supra note 32, R. SMITH, MOON OF POPPING TREES (1975), D.
BROWN, BURY My HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1970), J. McGREGOR, THE WOUNDED KNEE
MASSACRE (FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE SIOUX) (1940).
34. R. UTLEY, supra note 33, at 44.
35. While exact figures are impossible, estimates place the North American bison pop-
ulation at 40,000,000 in 1800. By 1895, there may have been as few as 800 bison left. See 3
E. SETON, LIVES OF GAME ANIMALS, Part 2 at 670 (1953).
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Never defeated militarily, by 1890 the Lakota's way of life was a
memory confined to the past as they were transformed from a free
nation of proud individuals to dependant wards of the United
States government. This transformation
had plunged the Sioux to depths of despair unprecedented in
their history. Virtually every meaningful custom had been at-
tacked or proscribed, every institution :damaged or destroyed.
That they could not avoid adopting some of the alien customs
and institutions thrust upon them only intensified their grief over
the loss of the old. A pervasive feeling of bitterness, helplessness,
and futility gripped the Sioux.3
B. Vanishing Traditions and the Ghost Dance Religion
During this age of despair, word began to drift across the
Plains that a messiah had come to resurrect Indian culture.3 7 Re-
ceptive to such a message, the Lakota sent several delegates to in-
vestigate this messiah. The delegates traveled by horse, train, and
wagon 8 to Walker Lake on the Paiute Reservation in western Ne-
vada, where a Paiute Indian named Wovoka claimed that he had
experienced a vision during a solar eclipse. Wovoka explained that,
"when the sun died, I went up to heaven and saw God and all the
people who had died a long time ago. God told me to come back
and tell my people they must be good and love one another, and
not fight, or steal, or lie. He gave me this dance to give to my peo-
ple. ' '3 9 God instructed Wovoka that if the Indians adhered to his
instructions, by the summer of the following year (1891) an Indian
millennium would occur in which the adherents to the new religion
would be joined by their ancestors to live in a bountiful world void
of Europeans. Wovoka distilled the gospel of this new religion to
the simple doctrine, "You must not fight. Do no harm to anyone.
Do right always,"' 0 and instructed that its ceremonial celebration
36. R. UTLEY, supra note 33, at 39.
37. Among anthropologists, the Ghost Dance Religion is considered a "revitalization
movement," which is "a deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of a society to'
construct a more satisfying culture." Wallace, Revitalization Movements, 58 Am. ANTHRO-
POLOGIST 265 (1956). Typically, these movements are a response to the cultural destruction
wrought by colonialism, having occurred in Asia and Indonesia, Polynesia, Melanesia, Cen-
tral and South America, and Africa, as well as in North America. R. THORNTON, WE SHALL
LIE AGAIN: THE 1870 AND 1890 GHOST DANCE MOVEMENTS As DEMOGRAPHIC REVITALIZATION
16 (1986).
38. Ironically, without European conventions, such as trains, telegraphs, written lan-
guage, and mail, the Ghost Dance Religion would not have spread so far so fast.
39. J. MOONEY, THE GHOST-DANCE RELIGION AND THE SIOUX OUTBREAK OF 1890, at 2
(1896).
40. Id. at 18.
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should take the form of a dance, which came to be known as the
Ghost Dance.41
After visiting the self-proclaimed messiah and witnessing sev-
eral demonstrations of his power, the Lakota delegates returned to
the reservations to make their reports. "On the report of these del-
egates the dance was at once inaugurated and spread so rapidly
that in a few months the new religion had been accepted by the
majority of the tribe." 2
The Ghost Dance was a sacred and solemn event "that re-
quired much preparation and much attention to form. '43 For
twenty-four hours prior to the ceremony, the tribal leaders fasted.
After this preparation, the dancers formed a giant circle, gathering
around a dance tree decorated with eagle feathers, bright cloth,
and on occasion, an American flag. The dancers wore feathers in
their hair, and it was the Lakota who wore the famous Ghost shirt,
believed to be bullet proof. All' willing members of the tribe partic-
ipated, which was unusual for most Lakota dances. After a ceremo-
nial invocation, the actual dance began; the dancers shuffled slowly
in a circle and sang songs reflecting the hope that the millennium
promised. The dance continued for hours as the participants inter-
mittently fell exhausted to the ground and experienced visions,
during which they would visit ancestors and catch glimpses of the
world to come. 4
When related to non-participants, these visions must have
spurred the spread of the new religion among the Lakota. Soon
after the introduction of the Ghost Dance, many of the Indians
abandoned their reservation cabins and farms and pitched lodges
in newly formed dance camps. As these camps grew, so did the
frequency of the dances, which eventually became a daily event.
This religious fervor, evidenced in the expanding dance camps and
daily dances, alarmed Indian agents and other white observers.
The reactions of these individuals led to the tragedy at Wounded
Knee.
41. Mooney claimed that the Ghost Dance was variously named among the different
tribes. Most tribes of the Plains, including the Lakota, called it the "spirit" or "ghost"
dance, and this has become its popular name. Id. at 35.
42. Id. at 29.
43. R. SMITH, supra note 33, at 83. Accurate accounts of the Ghost Dance do not exist,
but available evidence provides some idea of the ritual.
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C. A Traditional Approach: The Government's Reaction to the
Religious Movement
The series of events leading to the massacre reflected the in-
creasing disarray on the, reservations and the perplexity on the
part of the government regarding how to react to the religious
movement. The general white reaction was predominantly one of
terror in response to a perceived militaristic uprising. Accordingly,
the government took affirmative steps to check the religious fervor
of the Lakota. To their credit, the Indian agents in charge of the
reservations first attempted to deal with (i.e., stop) the Ghost
Dance movement themselves. Despite their efforts, however, the
dancing continued, and the religion spread.
Of particular significance was its spread to the Standing Rock
Reservation, home of Sitting Bull. To whites, Sitting Bull was an
enigmatic figure. To some whites then, as well as now, Sitting Bull
represented the noble, but inevitably doomed, attempt by the
American Indian to retain his freedom. To others, Sitting Bull con-
stituted a threat. According to the agent in charge of Sitting Bull's
reservation:
Sitting Bull is high priest and leading apostle of this latest Indian
absurdity; in a word he is the chief mischief-maker at this agency,
and if he were not here this craze, so general among the Sioux,
would never have gotten a foothold at this agency. Sitting Bull is
a man of low cunning, devoid of a single manly principle in his
nature or an honorable trait of character, but on the contrary is
capable of instigating and inciting others (those who believe in his
powers) to do any amount of mischief. ...
Sitting Bull is a polygamist, libertine, habitual liar, active ob-
structionist, and a great obstacle in the civilization of these
people. '
Once Sitting Bull's name was associated with the new religion, vio-
lent confrontation loomed on the horizon. Indeed, less than a
month after Sitting Bull and his people first learned the Ghost
Dance, which by that time had been practiced by other Lakota for
several months, the press began fanning the flames of confronta-
tion. After the Standing Rock Reservation agent sent the above
quoted letter to Washington, the Chicago Daily Tribune printed
the letter virtually verbatim, headlining it,
45. Letter from James McLaughlin to T.J. Morgan, Comm'r of Indian Affairs (Oct. 17,
1890), quoted in R. SMITH, supra note 33, at 107.
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TO WIPE OUT THE WHITES
What the Indians Expect Of The
Coming Messiah
FEARS OF AN OUTBREAK
Old Sitting Bull Stirring Up the
Excited Redskins46
As the white reaction grew more confrontational, the dancing
craze continued. "By mid-November Ghost Dancing was so preva-
lent on the Sioux reservations that almost all other activities came
to a halt. No pupils appeared at the schoolhouses, the trading
stores were empty, no work was done on the little farms." '' 7
At this point, the Army was asked to solve the growing prob-
lem. Coinciding with the Army's command were a flurry of news-
paper headlines proclaiming that,
IN A STATE OF TERROR
Great Excitement at the Pine
Ridge Agency
Indians Dancing with Guns;"8
The Messiah Expected To Arrive At
The Pine Ridge Agency To-Day,
When The Savages Will Fight; 9
WITH RIFLE ON BACK
The Red Skins Are Dancing The
Dreaded Ghost Dance. 0
Interestingly, the local newspapers saw a different story evolv-
ing. After visiting the Pine Ridge Reservation, a reporter for a Ne-
braska newspaper commented that, "It is hard after visiting Pine
Ridge Agency, to write with patience of the liars, big and little,
who have filled the continent with scare headlines and inflam-
46. Chicago Daily Tribune, Oct. 28, 1890, quoted in R. SMITH, supra note 33, at 111.
47. D. BROWN, supra note 33, at 435-36.
48. Chicago Daily Tribune, Nov. 20, 1890, quoted in R. SMITH, supra note 33, at 132.
49. New York Times, Nov. 20, 1890, quoted in R. SMITH, supra note 33, at 132.
50. Omaha Daily Bee, Nov. 20, 1890, quoted in R. SMITH, supra note 33, at 132.
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matory reports in the past two weeks.""1 Similarly, the Pierre Free
Press challenged, "If ever a stupendous fake was better faked ...
than this latest Sioux Indian hostility racket, please tell us about
it!" and observed, "[I]t is when one approaches the alleged scenes
of hostility that he begins to comprehend the dimensions of the
grand farce."52 Outraged by rampant sensationalism, the editor of
the Sturgis, South Dakota newspaper chastised the Eastern yellow
journalists:
Isn't it about time some of these wild and wooly newspaper liars.
• . be spanked and sent out of harm's way? ... There never was
any danger of an Indian outbreak, and none exists now, unless
these silly sensational reports have scared people into acts that
might properly be construed by an Indian into a desire to fight.
... This ghost dance has been worked up into a very wonder-
ful and exciting matter by pinheaded "war correspondents" and
other irresponsible parties until they have succeeded in massing
nearly half the United States army to be spectators to an Indian
pow wow. 63
The Indians were equally dismayed that a religious ceremony
created such trepidation and were outraged when troops marched
into their land. Little Wound, a leader of a dance camp, pondered,
What have we done? We have done nothing. Our dance is a reli-
gious one, and we are going to dance until spring. If we find then
that the new Christ does' not appear we will stop dancing, but in
the meantime, troops or no troops, we are going to start our dance
at [Medicine Root] creek this morning. 4
Despite such sentiments, with the Eastern press clamoring for
action, the Army decided to march into Pine Ridge. Even with the
presence of the soldiers, the Lakota continued dancing in their
camps; although a group of over 1000 Indians did trek to a desolate
and remote area of the Badlands known as the Stronghold where
they intended to dance throughout the winter. Because the reli-
gious movement continued, the Army, determining further action
was necessary, decided to arrest Sitting Bull. On December 15,
1890, Indian police surrounded Sitting Bull's cabin. In the process
51. Chadron (Neb.) Advocate, late Nov., 1890, quoted in R. SMITH, supra note 33, at
138.
52. Pierre (S.D.) Free Press, late Nov., 1890, quoted in R. SMITH, supra note 33, at
138.
53. Sturgis (S.D.) Weekly Record, Nov. 28, 1890, quoted in R. SMITH, supra note 33, at
139.
54. R. SMITH, supra note 33, at 131.
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of his arrest, Sitting Bull was killed. 55
The Indian reaction to the assassination was remarkably re-
strained, perhaps because of the calming and sustaining influence
of the Ghost Dance Religion."6 Fear of the Ghost Dance led to Sit-
ting Bull's death; yet the same religion calmed the Indians when
their leader was murdered. After Sitting Bull's death; hundreds
fled the Standing Rock Reservation to join other Ghost Dance
camps, including one under the leadership of Big Foot. Joining Big
Foot would prove to be a fatal mistake.
As soon as they learned of Sitting Bull's assassination, Big
Foot's band opted to move their camp to Pine Ridge where they
would be under the protection of Red Cloud, a long-time leader of
the Lakota whose relationship with the whites was far more cordial
than many of the tribe's other leaders. Unbeknownst to Big Foot,
however, the Army considered him a renegade cut from the same
cloth as Sitting Bull. To Nelson Miles, the Army general in charge
of the campaign, Big Foot was "very cunning and [his Indians]
very bad."5 Miles ordered Big Foot and his followers arrested. By
this time, Big Foot's people were a haggard and motley band of
roughly 120 men and 230 women and children, ration-starved and
with no means of subsistence. Big Foot himself, stricken with
pneumonia, was confined to a wagon bed.
On December 28, 1890, this formidable military threat, upon
sighting Army troops, raised a 'White flag from Big Foot's wagon
and peacefully agreed to camp under the Army's auspices at
Wounded Knee Creek. According to Lakota survivors, the Indians
were told that the next day troops would escort them to Pine
Ridge, where they could join Red Cloud. Following orders, the In-
dians camped along the creek, where they were joined by addi-
tional Army troops later in the evening. These troops brought with
them orders to transport Big Foot's band to a military prison in
Omaha; they also brought two Hotchkiss guns, which joined the
two Hotchkisses already placed on the hill overlooking the Indian
encampment.
Early the next morning, the Lakota men were ordered to come
to the center of the camp, which had already been surrounded by
mounted soldiers. Upon orders, the warriors surrendered their
guns. Dissatisfied with the number of guns produced, the soldiers
began searching the packs and lodges of the Lakota, gathering any
instruments that had lethal potential and heaping them in a pile.
55. D. BROWN, supra note 33, at 438.
56. Id. at 439.
57. R. SMITH, supra note 33, at 4.
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Still not satisfied, the soldiers began to go "among the Indians,
[throw] back their blankets [to] look at their belts to see if they
had any knives or other things that could be used to fight with.
5 s
The Lakota did not protest any of these intrusions, although a
medicine man named Yellow Bird began shuffling his feet in a
dance and proclaimed,
Do not be afraid! Let your hearts be strong to meet what is before
you! There are lots of soldiers and they have lots of bullets, but
the prairie is large and the bullets will not go toward you, but
over the large prairies."
Meanwhile, the searches of the Indians revealed that some of
the Lakota were indeed concealing weapons. One, Black Coyote,
refused to surrender his rifle, arguing that he had paid a great sum
for the rifle and that it belonged to him. What happened next is
unclear. According to a Lakota eyewitness,
If they had left him alone he was going to put his gun down
where he should. They grabbed him and spinned him in the east
direction. He was still unconcerned even then. He hadn't his gun
pointed at anyone. His intention was to put that gun down. Right
after they spun him around there was the report of a gun, [which]
was quite loud. 0
Many of the survivors spoke of this loud noise and the resulting
carbon haze as the Army responded instantaneously to the report
of Black Coyote's rifle." Some of the survivors contested what has
become the official shot-fired-in-a-scuffle story.62
Regardless of who fired the first shot, the subsequent Army
assault was merciless. The Hotchkiss guns raked the Lakota camp,
blindly mowing down Indians, regardless of age or sex, and shred-
ding the Indian lodges. Big Foot and the warriors ordered to the
center of the camp were the first victims, yet the soldiers were re-
lentless in their barrage. Most of the warriors were slaughtered
near where the fight began, but women and children "were found
scattered along for two miles from the scene of the encounter,
showing that they had been killed while trying to escape."6 Esti-
58. Statement of Charley Blue Arm, a Lakota survivor, quoted in J. McGREGOR, supra
note 33, at 27-28.
59. R. SMITH, supra note 33, at 187.
60. Statement of Dewey Beard, quoted in J. McGREGOR, supra note 33, at 95.
61. See J. MCGREGOR, supra note 33, at 98-125.
62. Commenting on this version of the story, Joseph Black Hair contended, "It is very
wrong," and Charley Blue Arm suggested that an Army officer ordered the soldiers to fire.
See id. at 67, 124, 128.
63. J. MOONEY, supra note 39, at 27.
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mates vary, but certainly more than half of the Lakota were killed.
Three days after the massacre, the Army hired a party to return to
Wounded Knee Creek and collect and bury the bodies of the Indi-
ans in a mass grave. By this time, the dead lay frozen in grotesque
shapes under the cover of freshly fallen snow.
D. A Traditional Consequence: Wounded Knee as an
Illustration of Religious Persecution
This is the story of Wounded Knee. I purposely use the word
story to make a point. Reconstructing factual history is inherently
problematic, particularly when events occur on wind-swept prairies
far removed from the instruments of Western civilization. Memo-
ries that recreate the event are emotionally charged and suscepti-
ble to formulating the sequence of events to satisfy these emotions.
We will never know who fired the shot that triggered the blood-
bath at Wounded Knee. This fact is lost in history. The injustice
suffered by Indians is not.
Wounded Knee dramatically illustrates the government's per-
sistent suppression of Lakota religious beliefs. In 1883, the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs "distributed a set of rules designed to
stamp out 'demoralizing and barbarous' customs. The directive de-
fined a number of 'Indian Offenses.' It was an offense to hold feasts
and dances, including the Sun Dance. ' 64 This government's effort
at suppression was systematic: "[w]ith the proscription of the Sun
Dance, the social and religious framework of the Sioux began to
give way." ' When the Lakota turned to the Ghost Dance for reli-
gious salvation, the government not only proscribed it, but also re-
sorted to unleashing military power to prevent the Indians from
practicing their religion. The government misunderstood the moti-
vations of the Lakota. Rather than recognizing its religious basis,
most white observers perceived the Ghost Dance as a militaristic
uprising. Because this misunderstanding motivated the govern-
ment actions, the suppression of the Ghost Dance cannot be ex-
plained simply as a shrewd and instrumental maneuver by the gov-
ernment to destroy Lakota culture. Instead, the invasion of the
Lakota lands and subsequent massacre are more completely under-
stood as a reflection of the government's ethnocentric inability to
correctly perceive the Ghost Dance as a religious movement."
64. R. UTLEY, supra note 33, at 31.
65. Id. at 33.
66. As will be explained infra, ethnocentrism (and not any shrewd or devious designs)
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That the Ghost Dance was religious, and not militaristic, in
orientation is undisputable. The religion's central tenets-You
must not fight. Do no harm to anyone. Do right always.-preached
non-violence and pacifism. The Lakota embraced this gospel. As
one of the dancers pleaded when the Army invaded their land,
"What have we done? We have done nothing. Our dance is a reli-
gious one .... "67 In fact, the religious and inward-looking orienta-
tion of the Ghost Dance did not escape all white observers. When
asked to assess the movement, a former Indian agent counseled,
I should let the dance continue. The coming of the troops has
frightened the Indians. If the Seventh-Day Adventists prepare
their ascension robes for the second coming of the Savior, the
United States Army is not put in motion to prevent them. Why
should not the Indians have the same privilege? 68
This individual, and others like him, understood that the Ghost
Dance was a religious ceremony and not a militaristic uprising. In-
spired by a sensationalist press and other societal influences, how-
ever, the Army failed to appreciate the difference despite the obvi-
ous Christian overtones of the messianic religion. In retrospect, the
mistake was obvious but explicable, given the ethnocentrism that
taints our perceptions of Native American religious practices.
That the Wounded Knee tragedy is arguably explainable does
not justify it. If the Indian agents, the press, the Army and govern-
ment officials had recognized the religious impulses and non-vio-
lent intentions of the Lakota, hundreds of lives could have been
spared and a historical legacy of shame and bitterness could have
been avoided.
Despite the costs of our forebearers' inability to understand
the Ghost Dance movement, our ignorance of Native American re-
ligions continues today. This misunderstanding is manifest in judi-
cial decisions that deny Indian religious claims. The courts explain
that this denial results because the Indians are not presenting con-
stitutionally cognizable religious claims. In other words, the Indian
claims are either not truly religious or do not constitute the kind of
religion that our society chooses to indulge. Thus, the courts deny
Indian religious freedom because judges either simply do not com-
prehend Indian religious beliefs or else subconsciously feel that the
sacrifice necessary to protect these beliefs is prohibitive. If judges
were less constricted by their Western heritage, American Indian
religions might be protected in compliance with the first amend-
67. R. SMITH, supra note 33, at 131.
68. Report of the U.S. Comm'r of Indian Affairs 333 (1891).
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ment's dictate that the government "shall make no law... prohib-
iting the free exercise [of religion.]" 9
III. A GRAND TRADITION?: NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The continuing inability of our society to comprehend and ap-
preciate the religions of Native Americans is reflected in first
amendment case law, both in the results of the cases, which fre-
quently deny Indian religious rights, and in the flavor of the opin-
ions, which rarely transcend Judeo-Christian notions of religion to
grasp the spirituality of American Indian religions. Of all the
courts, the United States Supreme Court is unsurpassed in mani-
festing this disability.70 Indeed, despite the dramatic increase in
cases in which Indians assert their freedom of religion, the Su-
preme Court has made a conscious and concerted effort to avoid
addressing the grievances of the Indians. To avoid reaching these
issues, the Court has either denied certiorari"1 or entertained dis-
cussion of an aberrational Indian religious claim but has not issued
an opinion on one of the more litigated issues of sacred sites or
peyote use. 2
Although Indians have regularly asserted free exercise rights
in the federal and state courts, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Association,7 decided during the 1988 term, was
69. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
70. The High Court again confirmed this disability in Smith.
71. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Hopi and Navajo suit
claiming that a proposed ski resort would destroy a sacred site), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956
(1984); Fools Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1982) (Sioux suit attempting to limit
public access to the proposed Bear Butte State Park), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983);
Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980) (Navajo suit claiming that Glen Canyon
project would destroy a religious site), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Sequoyah v. Ten-
nessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.) (Cherokee suit claiming that Tellico Dam pro-
ject would destroy a religious site), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Oliver v. Udall, 306
F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (action by Navajo Indians to declare Code of Indian Tribal Of-
fenses banning peyote null and void failed to show the existence of a case and controversy
as only an abstract question was presented), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 908 (1963); State v.
Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973) (protection of peyote use by Native
American Church members), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974); State v. Soto, 21 Or. App.
794, 537 P. 2d 142 (1975) (religious users of peyote are not exempt from criminal prosecu-
tions), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976).
72. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (upheld the constitutionality of requiring
Indian children to obtain Social Security registrations despite their religious objections but
did not have occasion to rule on sacred sites or peyote use); Native Am. Church of Navajo-
land, Inc. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 405 U.S. 901 (1972) (in the context of issuing an order
on procedural grounds, the Court discussed peyote use and the Native American Church but
did not reach any conclusions regarding the constitutionality of peyote use).
73. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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the first case in which the High Court delineated Indians' free ex-
ercise rights with regard to either the peyote use or sacred site is-
sues. Before examining that opinion, this article will outline the
reigning (pre-Smith) free exercise jurisprudence and the lower
courts' and the Supreme Court's application of this free exercise
doctrine to both peyote use and sacred site cases. These cases illus-
trate that the attitudes and misconceptions that led to Wounded
Knee are still operative in denying religious freedom to Indians to-
day. Moreover, comparing the peyote decisions with the sacred site
decisions will reveal that the "costs" of protecting Native Ameri-
cans' free exercise rights become an operative dynamic in the judi-
cial resolution of these cases.
A. An Overview of Traditional Free Exercise Jurisprudence
The purpose of this review74 is to outline the handful of first
amendment decisions that figure most prominently in the sacred
site and peyote use cases. The Supreme Court first seriously inter-
preted the free exercise clause inReynolds v. United States.7' The
defendant Reynolds claimed that polygamy was an exercise of his
religion and, thus, protected from congressional regulation by the
first amendment. The Court rejected this claim on the grounds
that "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere
opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation
of social duties or subversive of good order. ' 76 Consequently,
Reynolds was free to believe whatever he wanted, but if acting on
his beliefs resulted in behavior that was inimical to "social duties"
and "good order," then his behavior could be regulated. The Court
found polygamy to be an "odious" custom and, thus, subject to
legislative control. 7
The distinction between freedom to believe and freedom to act
dominated free exercise jurisprudence for many years. Cases like
Cantwell v. ConnecticutU maintained this distinction, explaining
that the first amendment "embraces two concepts,-freedom to
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature
of things, the second cannot be. [Thus,] [c]onduct remains subject
74. This overview is not intended to be exhaustive. For such a review, see, e.g., Lay-
cock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409 (1986).
75. 98 U.S. 145 (1878)(criminal prosecution of a Mormon for violating anti-polygamy
laws).
76. Id. at 164.
77. Id. at 164-65.
78. 310 U.S. 296 (1940)(conviction of Jehovah's Witnesses for soliciting funds without
a license struck down because they were distributing religious materials).
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to regulation for the protection of society. 7 9
In Sherbert v. Verner,80 however, the Court held for the first
time that the free exercise clause protects religiously motivated
conduct. In this decision, Justice Brennan developed a two-part
test to evaluate the extent of first amendment protection for relig-
iously motivated conduct. The first step is to determine whether
the government action imposes any burden on the free exercise of
the claimant's religion.8 1 If such a burden is found, then the court
must consider whether some -compelling state interest justifies the
infringement on claimant's free exercise right. With regard to this
calculus, the Court emphasized that "in this highly sensitive con-
stitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.' "82 Even if para-
mount interests are found, the Court placed the burden on the
state "to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation"
would serve such interests "without infringing first amendment
rights." 3
The Court employed the Sherbert balancing test in Wisconsin
v. Yoder,8 4 a case in which the Amish claimed that high school at-
tendance was contrary to their religion and the Amish way of life.
Under the first step of the Sherbert test-determining whether the
state action burdened the free exercise of the Amish religious be-
liefs-the Court found such a burden, concluding in the process
that the Amish religious faith and their mode of life are insepara-
ble and interdependent.8 5 This finding triggered the second part of
the Sherbert analysis-evaluating the compelling state interests
that justify this burden. Emphasizing the Amish communities' his-
toric success at self-education, the Court did not find the state's
interest in one or two more years of schooling adequately compel-
ling, and held that the Amish could not be fined for violating the
mandatory school-attendance law. The Sherbert test, as illustrated
by its application in Yoder, is the jurisprudential paradigm for ad-
judicating both peyote use and sacred site cases.86
79. Id. at 303-04.
80. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday
for religious reasons could not be denied state unemployment benefits).
81. Id. at 403.
82. Id. at 406 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, reh'g denied, 323 U.S. 819
(1945)).
83. Id. at 407 (citations omitted).
84: 406 U.S. 205 (1972)(Amish parents convicted by lower court of violating the
State's compulsory school-attendance law by refusing to send their children to school after
they had graduated from the eighth grade).
85. Id. at 215-16.
86. If Smith fulfills its revolutionary potential, however, the Sherbert test will become
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B. Peyote and the Emerging Traditions of the Native
American Church
Native Americans first raised free exercise claims in the con-
text of the ceremonial use of peyote in the Native American
Church. Peyote (Lophophora williamsii) is a spineless cactus that
grows in the Rio Grande Valley of the United States and south-
ward into northern Mexico. The Spanish conquerors noted the pre-
Columbian ritual use of peyote by the Aztecs; however, peyotism
did not spread into the Great Plains and beyond until the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 7 In 1918, the Native
American Church was first incorporated in Oklahoma and included
ritual peyote use as an integral aspect of its ceremonial worship.
The Native American Church is now a recognized religious body
throughout the United States, and "[tihe Peyote Religion or Pe-
yote Way, as it is called by members, is the most widespread con-
temporary religion among the Indians .... '8
The Native American Church service is an all-night ceremony,
usually lasting from sunset to sunrise, and is typically held in a
Plains-style tipi. The ritual itself is comprised of four elements:
prayer, singing, eating the sacramental peyote, and contemplation.
The Church's adherents consider peyote a teacher and an integral
part of their religion. In their minds, peyote provides a heightened
sense of self-understanding and awareness. Because it inspires re-
vealing visions, peyote creates a link between humans and the su-
pernatural.89 Native American Church members consider peyote an
integral part of their religion.
Although peyote use within the Native American Church does
not fit the model of American Indian religions outlined in Part I,
the judicial resolution of ritual peyote use is relevant to the courts'
handling of sacred site claims. Most courts (with the Supreme
Court's decision in Smith being the major exception) are willing to
indulge peyote use under the first amendment but are unwilling to
recognize the free exercise rights of Native Americans to preserve
sacred land from development. This disparity may be explained by
the relative costs that recognizing each free exercise right entails:
(largely) obsolete.
87. W. LA BARRE, THE PEYOTE CULT 109 (1938).
88. Slotkin, The Peyote Way, in TEACHINGS FROM THE AMERICAN EARTH 96 (1975).
The Native American Church is not to be confused with the Peyote Way Church of God,
Inc., a non-Indian peyote-based religious group, whose equal protection challenge to ex-
empted use of peyote by members of the Native American' ChUrch recently failed. Peyote
Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991).
89. Slotkin, supra note 88, at 101-02.
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protecting peyote use within the Native American Church under
the free exercise clause is relatively cost-free to society at large;
whereas perpetually preserving land from development deprives
society of exploiting one of its prime resources-real estate. Be-
cause these differing consequences influence the judicial resolution
of peyote use and sacred site claims, it is necessary to canvass the
peyote cases before examining the. sacred site claims that are in-
spired by the American Indian religious beliefs previously outlined.
C. The Peyote Issue and the First Amendment Tradition
The first court to entertain an Indian claim for free exercise
protection was the Montana Supreme Court in 1926.90 Thirty-six
years after Wounded Knee, the Plains Indians were graciously ele-
vated from the prairie to the courtroom as a forum for dispute res-
olution. A different forum did not, however, produce a totally dif-
ferent result. In State v. Big Sheep, the Crow Indian defendant
claimed that his possession of peyote was protected on first
amendment grounds and, thus, could not be criminalized. The
court considered this assertion with incredulity, commenting that
the free exercise defense "is not insisted upon with much serious-
ness in this court."91 The court reasoned that the criminalization of
peyote possession was consistent with maintaining the "peace,
good order and morals of society." 92 The court disclosed its juris-
prudential Christian bias by citing the Bible's preclusion of peyote
use9 ' and by failing to recognize the uniquely religious nature of
the Indian peyote experience. 4 In retrospect, although Big Sheep
received more due process than the Lakota at Wounded Knee, the
Indians were still dancing to a drum beat so beyond Western expe-
rience that the court refused even to acknowledge as bona fide the
religious claim.
1. Woody-The Breakthrough Case
By the 1960s, at least one court began to grasp the distinctive
nature of Native American religious beliefs. In People v. Woody,9
90. State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067 (1926).
91. Id. at 238, 243 P. at 1072.
92. Id. at 240, 243 P. at 1073.
93. "We do not find peyote or any like herb mentioned by Isaiah, or by Saint Paul in
his epistle to the Romans, nor does it seem from the language employed that Saint John the
Divine had any such in mind." Id. at 239, 243 P. at 1073.
94. "[I]f carried to the length defendant insists upon, the use of opium, cocaine and
even 'moonshine' might be justified under the guise of religious observance." Id.
95. 61 Cal. 2d. 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
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police entered a Navajo hogan in the California desert and arrested
the defendants for possession of peyote. The Navajo claimed that
because their possession of peyote was incident to their religious
worship in the Native American Church, criminalizing their pos-
session of peyote was tantamount to denying the free exercise of
their religion. The state did not deny that at the time of their ar-
rest the Navajos were performing a religious ceremony, but argued
that their possession of peyote was nonetheless a crime. Utilizing
the Sherbert test,96 the California Supreme Court balanced the
compelling state interest in criminalizing peyote use against the in-
fringement imposed on American Indian religious beliefs. In
marked contrast to the Montana court's summary treatment of the
relevance of peyote to Indian religious beliefs, Justice Tobriner de-
tailed the effects of peyote,97 the history of the Native American
Church, and the ceremony in which peyote is ingested. Justice To-
briner identified peyote as the Native American Church's sacra-
mental equivalent to bread and wine.9 After canvassing these de-
tails," the court held that the state did not offer sufficiently
compelling interests to justify the infringement on Indian religion
that a peyote ban would impose; the court was not persuaded by
the state's chronicle of negative consequences (i.e., drug addiction,
harmful side effects, and fraudulent assertion of religious immu-
nity to mask illicit drug use)."'0 In concluding that "the use of pe-
yote incorporates the essence of [Native American] religious ex-
pression" and thus warrants first amendment protection, the court
emphasized that by protecting an ancient Indian tradition, free-
dom of religious expression was maintaining the "depth and
96. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
97. Justice Tobriner's characterization of these effects links it to an era ostensibly far
removed from the drug-paranoid society of today.
In most subjects [peyote] causes extraordinary vision marked by bright and kalei-
doscopic colors, geometric patterns, or scenes involving humans or animals....
Beyond its hallucinatory effect, peyote renders for most users a heightened sense
of comprehension; it fosters a feeling of friendliness toward other persons.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 720, 394 P.2d at 816-17, 40. Cal. Rptr. at 72-73.
98. Id. at 720-21, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
99. For a criticism of the court's canvassing approach, see Note, Constitutional Law:
Dubious Intrusions -, Peyote, Drug Laws and Religious Freedom, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 79
(1980). The note counseled that "whether intended or not, the description of peyotism, with
its references to a long history, many members, and Christian parallels, reads like a litany of
what the court considers to be religious characteristics." Id. at 88. The student note also
foresaw the reliance on Woody to develop the centrality doctrine, "Woody should not, how-
ever, be regarded as authority that only central, essential religious practices can hope to
avoid state regulation." Id. at 89. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
100. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 722-24, 394 P.2d'at 817-19, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73-75.
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beauty" of our diverse society. 1 ' Certainly, this court understood
the religious beliefs of Native American Church members and the
prescripts of the free exercise clause far better than the Montana
court fifty years earlier.
After Woody, state courts considering the issue tended to rec-
ognize the first amendment right of Native Americans to use pe-
yote in their religious practices. 102 However, an Oregon court de-
nied the right of Native American Church members to use peyote.
In State v. Soto, 0 3 the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld the de-
fendant's conviction for peyote possession, even though the de-
fendant possessed peyote for use in Native American Church
worship.1
0 4
Unlike the religious use cases, the companion cases of Smith v.
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources10 5 and
Black v. Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources0 6 explored whether the state could deny unemployment
compensation benefits to drug rehabilitation counselors who were
discharged after using peyote in a Native American Church ser-
vice."'7 Limiting the holding in Soto'0 8 to criminal sanctions, the
Oregon Supreme Court reasoned that under Sherbert, the state's
interest in denying the unemployment claims was purely financial
and that this was not sufficiently compelling to justify burdening
the Native Americans' free exercise rights.109
The state appealed these decisions to the United States Su-
preme Court, where the cases were joined." 0 Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Stevens was uncomfortable with the Oregon court's
101. Id. at 727-28, 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
102. State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 504 P.2d 950 (1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 946 (1974); Whitehorn v. State, 561 P.2d 539 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977). Whittingham
and Whitehorn involved the criminal charges of peyote possession against Native American
Church members. But see State v. Soto, 21 Or. App. 794, 537 P.2d 142 (1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 955 (1976).
103. 21 Or. App. 794, 537 P.2d 142 (1975).
104. The court reasoned that under the Sherbert test, the state's interest in preserving
the health and safety of the people justified condemning Native American religious prac-
tices. Id. at 798, 537 P.2d at 143-44. In his vigorous dissent, Judge Fort maintained that
under the majority's calibration of the Sherbert test, once the legislature exercises its police
power to determine that possession of a substance is "inimical to the public weal, such deci-
sion precludes any consideration of the religious freedom" guaranteed by the first amend-
ment. Id. at 805, 537 P.2d at 147 (Fort, J., dissenting).
105. 301 Or. 209, 721 P.2d 445 (1986).
106. 301 Or. 221, 721 P.2d 451 (1986).
107. Smith and Black have made long and torturous journeys through the Oregon
state courts and the United States Supreme Court.
108. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
109. Smith, 301 Or. at 219-20, 721 P.2d at 450.
110. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
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position that although peyote possession was held to be illegal in
Soto, this conclusion did not affect the court's analysis in protect-
ing unemployment compensation in Smith. Justice Stevens per-
ceived an incongruity between these holdings, writing that "if Ore-
gon does prohibit the religious use of peyote, and if that
prohibition is consistent with the Federal Constitution, . . . the
state is free to withhold unemployment compensation from respon-
dents for engaging in work-related misconduct, despite its religious
motivation." ' Justice Stevens then suggested that regardless of
the Oregon court's decision on remand, it may ultimately be neces-
sary for the Supreme Court to decide "whether the ingestion of
peyote for sincerely held religious reasons is a form of conduct that
is protected by the Federal Constitution from the reach of a
State's criminal laws."" 2 The High Court did just that last term.
After the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the first amend-
ment protected peyote use and possession by Native American
Church members, " the Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
view the Oregon decision. " 4
2. Smith-A Revived Tradition
Reversing the trend originated by Woody, by a six-to-three
vote"1 5 the Court refused to recognize the free exercise rights of
Native Americans to use peyote as part of the Native American
Church's religious worship." 6 While Justice O'Connor retained the
Sherbert balancing test in her concurring opinion," 7  Justice
111. Id. at 672.
112. Id. The religious use of peyote in Indian country ordinarily would exempt Native
American Church members from criminal prosecution under state law. The extent to which
the state assumed criminal jurisdiction on Indian reservations under Public Law 280_would
determine the exact effect of this decision upon Indian peyote use. Because Oregon is among
the states originally mandated by Public Law 280 to assume criminal jurisdiction over all
Indian country within the state (except the Warm Springs Reservation), religious users of
peyote within Oregon are forced to seek protection under either the federal or state consti-
tutions. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1988).
113. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 307 Or. 68, 763 P.2d 146
(1988).
114. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
115. Justice Scalia's opinion of the court was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion, while
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined parts of her concurrence, but dissented
from its result.
116. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, reh'g
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990).
117. In her opinion, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the state interests in preventing
the use of harmful drugs and in waging the War on Drugs justified the Oregon ban on
peyote use in Native American Church ceremonies. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1614 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). While Justice O'Connor should be praised for her criticism of Justice Scalia's
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Scalia's majority opinion adopted a version of the Washington v.
Davis"'8 test used for identifying unconstitutional race discrimina-
tion.119 According to Justice Scalia, unless an act is specifically di-
rected at a religious practice, it is not unconstitutional. Conse-
quently, a law that only incidentally burdens a religion passes
constitutional muster. If this approach becomes the standard by
which free exercise rights are adjudicated, the Court has departed
significantly from Sherbert analysis.
The practical impact of this decision on Native American
Church members' use of peyote may be minimal. Currently, even
though peyote is listed as a Schedule I controlled substance,120 fed-
eral law exempts members of the Native American Church from
criminal prosecution for using peyote during "bona fide religious
ceremonies.""12
Although most states list peyote as a Schedule I controlled
substance,122 few have enacted legislation specifically proscribing
reworking of free exercise doctrine, id. at 1607, her Sherbert analysis is reminiscent of the
Court's treatment of Japanese-Americans in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), because, in each instance, a war justified the infringement of the victim's liberty.
Moreover, as Justice Blackmun's dissent pointed out, the harmful effects of peyote have not
been substantiated, so the compelling nature of this state interest is suspect. Smith, 110 S.
Ct. at 1618 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. 426 U.S. 229 (1976)(an intelligence test given by the District of Columbia for
prospective police officers did not violate equal protection based upon disproportionate im-
pact on blacks).
119. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1604 n.3. Justice Scalia's use of a footnote to plant the seed for
significant doctrinal departures is not unprecedented. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.3 (1987)(Justice Scalia arguing that the standard for review of
land regulation is greater than rational basis).
120. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (c)(c)(12) (1988).
121. Special Exempt Persons: Native American Church, 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1990)
(promulgated under the authority of 21 U.S.C. §§ 821, 822(d), 871(b)).
122. ALA. CODE § 20-2-23(3)(1) (1990); ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.150(16) (1989) (Alaska
lists peyote as Schedule IIA, a classification including mescaline and other drugs generally
categorized as Schedule I); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2512(3)(q) (1990); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
5-64-203 (1987) (establishes criteria for Schedule I, but authorizes specific categorization by
administrative regulation); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11054(d)(15) (West 1991); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 12-22-309(2)(a)(XIV) (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-243(b) (1989) (adopts fed-
eral regulations and authorizes categorization by administrative regulation); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, § 4714(d)(11) (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-514(3)(o) (1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
893.03(1)(c)(27) (West 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-25(3)(k) (1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 329-
14(d)(16) (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 37-2705(d)(17) (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 561/2,
para. 1204(d)(12) (Smith-Hurd 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-48-2-4(d)(17) (Burns 1990); IOwA
CODE ANN. § 2 04.204(4)(p) (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4105(d)(17) (Supp. 1990); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.050(3) (Baldwin 1982); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40.964(c)(11) (West
1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1102(2)(C)(3) (1983) (peyote is classified as "X" in
Maine's "WXYZ" scheduling scheme); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 279(a)(3)(c)(9) (1988);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 3 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (incorporates federal definition from 1970
Drug Control Act); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15(7212)(1)(c) (Callaghan 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 152.02 subd. 2(4) (West 1989); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-29-113(c)(14) (Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN.
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peyote use.1"' Eleven states have adopted statutes similar to the
federal exemption for sacramental peyote use.12 Another eleven
states incorporate the federal exemption into their state codes by
reference.12
STAT. § 195.017(2)(4)(q) (Vernon 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-222(3)(1) (1989); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-405(c)(12) (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.166 (1987) (authorizes board of phar-
macy to schedule and defines Schedule I substance as one that has "high potential for
abuse" and "no accepted medical use"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 318-B:1-b (1990) (authorizes
board of pharmacy to schedule and defines Schedule I substance as one that has "high po-
tential for abuse" and "no accepted medical use"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:21-5(e)(12) (West
1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-6(C)(12) (Supp. 1990) ("peyote, except as otherwise provided
in the Controlled Substances Act"); N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 3306(d)(16) (McKinney
1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-89(c)(11) (1990);'N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-05(5)(r) (Supp.
1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3719.41(c)(17) (Anderson 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-
204 (West 1984) (statute does not list peyote as Schedule I substance, but decision notes
reference federal exemption and Whitehorn v. State, 561 P.2d 539 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977));
OR. REV. STAT. § 475.035 (1987 & Supp. 1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-104(1)(iii)(11)
(Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-2.08(d)(12) (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-190(d)(12)
(Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-20B-14(17) (1986) (sacramental use in
Native American Church excepted (Supp. 1990)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-406(d)(15)
(Supp. 1990); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.032(a)(3) (Vernon 1991); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(Q) (Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4201(10) (1982) (lists pe-
yote as hallucinogenic subject to regulation by board of health); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
3446(3) (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.204(d)(16) (Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE § 60A-
2-204(d)(15) (1989); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 161.14(4)(m) (West 1989); WYO. STAT. § 35-7-
1014(d)(xvi) (1988).
123. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11363 (West 1991) ("Every person who plants,
cultivates, harvests, dries, or processes.., peyote .... shall be punished by imprisonment in
the county jail . . . or the state prison.").
124. Four states have statutes more liberal than the federal regulation. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3402(B) (1989) (provides defense if peyote used in "bona fide practice of a
religious belief"); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 12-22-317(3) (1990) (exempts peyote use in "religious
ceremonies of any bona fide religious organization"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.541 (1987) (crim-
inal sanctions inapplicable to peyote when used in "religious rites of any bona fide religious
organization"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-6(D) (Supp. 1989) ("enumeration of peyote as a
controlled substance does not apply to the use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies by
a bona fide religious organization").
Seven other states exempt ceremonial peyote use only for members of the Native Amer-
ican Church. IOWA CODE ANN. § 204.204(8) (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4116(c)(8)
(Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.02, subd. 2(4) (West 1989) (refers to "American Indian
Church"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-20B-14(17) (Supp. 1990); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 4476-15, § 4.11 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1991); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 161.115 (West 1988);
WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1044 (1988).
125. ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.195 (1989) ("A substance the manufacture, distribution, dis-
pensing, or possession of which is explicitly exempt from criminal penalty under federal law
is exempt from the application of [state law.]"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-203 (1989) ("If
any drug is ... rescheduled... under federal law and notice thereof is given to the board (of
pharmacy], the board shall similarly control the drug ... unless altered thereafter by the
board or by statute."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24.21-3(c) (West Supp. 1990) ("If any substance is.
. . rescheduled ... and notice thereof is given to the commissioner [of health], the commis-
sioner shall similarly control the substance . . . unless the substance is specifically otherwise
dealt with by an act of the Legislature."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-88(d) (1990) (the Commis-
sion "shall similarly control" rescheduled drugs "unless the Commission objects"); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-02(4) (Supp. 1989) (substantially similar wording); R.I GEN. LAWS §
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Perhaps the protection that state and federal statutes cur-
rently afford ritual peyote use made Smith the ideal case for Jus-
tice Scalia's introduction of a new free exercise doctrine: because
peyote use within the Native American Church is largely pro-
tected, the Smith doctrine has little practical impact on most Na-
tive Americans. This circumstance helps conceal the stifling effect
that the new doctrine portends for the adherents of other minority
religions whose practices might offend the Judeo-Christian main-
stream. The fact that Smith involved drug use also made this an
attractive case for Justice Scalia's reworking of free exercise doc-
trine. Most troubling, however, is the thought that because Indians
were the immediate victims of the new doctrine, this was a perfect
opportunity to revise the law. To illustrate this point, one need
only consider whether the Supreme Court would have pronounced
its new free exercise standard if a zealous district attorney had
prosecuted a Catholic priest for ministering communal wine to a
minor in violation of liquor laws.
D. Traditional Sacred Lands and the First Amendment
1. The Disparity Between Peyote Use and Sacred Site Decisions
The judiciary's inability to comprehend the religious beliefs of
Native Americans also permeates sacred site decisions. In these
cases, the Indian plaintiffs are asserting that public land proposed
for development is sacred to them. Thus, if the land is developed
and the area stripped of its sanctity, Indians can no longer enjoy
their free exercise rights. Compared to the peyote cases, the stakes
are much greater for the government when Indians assert sacred
site claims. Rather than indulging occasional peyote use among a
discrete minority, the government is threatened with religious
rights that, if protected, would ensure the perpetual restriction of
public land development. The severity of this sacrifice may explain
why Indians repeatedly lose sacred site litigation. In fact, the
United States Supreme Court recently overturned the only deci-
sion that protected Indian religious freedom at the expense of land
development.126 Apparently, an operative dynamic influencing the
judicial determination of American Indian religious freedom is the
21-28-2.01(c) (1989) (substantially similar wording); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-i7-403(d) (Supp.
1990) (substantially similar wording); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-3(3) (1990) ("Whenever any
substance is ... rescheduled . . . ,that subsequent ... rescheduling ... shall govern."); .VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-3443(D) (1988) (wording substantially similar to codes cited above except
Utah's); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.201(d) (West 1991) (substantially similar wording);
W. VA. CODE § 60A-2-201(d) (1989) (substantially similar wording).
126. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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cost to the government of recognizing the religious right.12 7 Per-
haps this one-dimensional cost analysis is the correct application
of the Sherbert test that was the relevant standard when the fed-
eral judiciary considered Indians' sacred site claims during the
1980s. In those cases, courts did a one-dimensional cost benefit
analysis, focusing solely on the cost and ignoring the benefit. 28
However, a balancing test that allows one factor of the equa-
tion-the cost to the government of tolerating religious diver-
sity-to dictate the outcome is hardly balanced.'29
By arguing that the costs of vindicating Native American sa-
cred site claims influence the judicial resolution of these issues,
this article does not abandon its primary thesis that ethnocentrism
prevents much of the judiciary from appreciating (and thus pro-
tecting) American Indian religious practice. The judiciary's cogni-
tive inability to transcend Western notions of religion dominates
sacred site jurisprudence and dictates the outcome of the sacred
site cases. This dominance results because the anti-development
127. Others have perceived this dynamic. See, e.g., Sewell, The American Indian Reli-
gious Freedom Act, 25 Anz. L. REv. 429 (1983).
Indian belief in the sacred character of physical places is precisely the prob-
lem for the first amendment analysis of Indian sacred sites .... [11n a modern
industrial culture, where property is considered the basic resource to be exploited
for the creation of value, the sacralization of a physical place is necessarily
threatening.
Id. at 465.
128. This calculation betrays the opinion of the Court in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, (labor organizing meetings are lawful exercises of first amendment right of assembly),
reh'g denied, 323 U.S. 819 (1945) in which the Court stated with regard to religious liberties
that "it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines what standard
governs the choice." Id. at 530.
129. The willingness of courts to permit Indians to practice their religion when the
government inconvenience is minimal is evidenced by a series of cases in which courts pro-
tected Native Americans' right to wear their hair in long braids in penal institutions or to
occasionally hunt out of season. See, e.g., Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975)
(regulation of state penitentiary prohibiting American Indian inmate from wearing long
braided hair impermissibly infringed on the inmate's first amendment right to the free exer-
cise of his religion); Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 516 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Va. 1981) (Because the
inmate's religious beliefs were sincere and the state had no overriding objective in cutting
the prisoner's hair, he has a first amendment right to exercise his religion by wearing his
hair long.), afl'd, 670 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1982); Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979)
(Because use of moose meat at a funeral service was a practice deeply rooted in defendant's
religion, his right to the free exercise of his religion shielded him from prosecution for hunt-
ing out of season.). But see, e.g., Hatch v. Georke, 502 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1974) (school can
regulate hair length of students, including Indians, but must provide due process in form of
an informal hearing before expulsion for violating the regulation); New Rider v. Board of
Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir.) (permissible for school districts to inhibit American Indians
religious freedom by regulating hair length), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973); State v.
Berry, 76 Or. App. 1, 707 P.2d 638 (1985) (During prosecution for violating fishing laws, trial
court did not commit plain error by refusing to include evidence regarding religious ceremo-
nies of Indian defendant.).
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consequence of protecting Indian religions is contrary to tradi-
tional Western emphasis upon development as a beneficial use of
land. Individuals who are alarmed by the anti-development conse-
quences of protecting sacred sites tend to be bound by the Western
Weltanschauung that views land as an inanimate resource whose
ultimate value rests in its exploitation and development, and not
in its religious significance. By virtue of their stature in society,
judges implicitly embody and radiate the (Western) values of our
society and, hence, are particularly susceptible to the ethnocentric
limitations of the Western ordering of the world. Given a choice
between perceiving land from a development perspective or from a
religious perspective, judges tend toward the anthropocentric and
development perspectives that our society and its institutions in-
culcate in them on a daily basis. Consequently, judges often are
unable to appreciate the American Indian Weltanschauung that
inspires sacred site claims.
Sacred site litigation is new to the judiciary's docket.1 30 More-
over, sacred site claims are distinct from traditional Indian reli-
gious freedom litigation (i.e., peyote cases). The peyote cases in-
volve state regulation of individual activity, which consequently
infringes on the individual's free exercise of religion. Sacred site
cases, on the other hand, concern the interference with a group's
free exercise of religion, precipitated by land development. As a
result of the difference in the cost of protecting Indian religious
freedom-one individual's peyote use versus preservation of land
from development-sacred site jurisprudence has grown distinct
from the analytical framework employed in the peyote decisions.1 31
130. The first fully resolved sacred site case was Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
131. The author of a Yale Law Journal note has argued that sacred site claims are not
only structurally different from peyote claims but also from most standard free exercise
claims.
Those suits, which include efforts to obtain exemption from the military draft or
compulsory education laws, differ fundamentally from Indian actions that seek to
bar development of government-owned lands. In the former, the government's ac-
tions themselves are not challenged. Rather the action as applied to particular
religious individuals is the heart of the dispute. Indian suits to block development,
on the other hand, challenge a generally valid governmental activity as it affects
certain religious sites, rather than certain religious individuals or segments of the
population.
Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of Public Lands, 94 YALE
L.J. 1447, 1459 (1985). As a result of these structural differences,
free exercise doctrine that has grown out of individual claims for exemption from
governmental activity is not equipped to deal with Indian suits. It tends to limit
the range of the free exercise clause to societally mainstream or nonthreatening
beliefs, or to the aspects of nontraditional beliefs that are similar to Euro-Ameri-
can practices. The reluctance of courts to provide protection against infringement
1991]
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2. Sequoyah, Ethnocentrism, and Misconstruction
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority1 2 illustrates the dis-
parity in jurisprudence between peyote decisions and sacred site
decisions. In Sequoyah, the court concluded that a religious claim
based on a sacred site does not present a cognizable first amend-
ment right. Although the court did not expressly state that the
timing of the Cherokee's request influenced its decision, the court
mentioned that the injunction request was filed less than a month
before impoundment was scheduled to begin. 133 After noting this
chronology, the court reviewed the geography and history of the
land that the Cherokee claimed was a sacred site and that would
be destroyed by the dam.13 4
The Cherokee supplied ample evidence confirming the sacred-
ness of the land in question. The lead plaintiff, Ammoneta Se-
quoyah, testified that,
If the water covers Choata and the other sacred places of the
Cherokee along the River, I will lose my knowledge of medicine.
If the lands are flooded, the medicine that comes from Choata
will be ended because the strength and spiritual power of the
Cherokee will be destroyed .... If this land is flooded and these
sacred places are destroyed, the knowledge and beliefs of my peo-
ple who are in the ground will be destroyed. 13 5
Emmaline Driver added, "If they are flooded, our spiritual
strength from our forefathers will be taken away from us, along
of Indian religions may thus stem from a general failure of free exercise
methodology.
Id. at 1461-62.
132. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). In Sequoyah, Chero-
kee plaintiffs requested an injunction to prevent the completion of the Tellico Dam and
subsequent flooding of the Little Tennessee River. The plaintiffs were three Cherokee Indi-
ans acting as individuals and two Cherokee tribal organizations. The lead plaintiff was Am-
moneta Sequoyah, a practicing Cherokee medicine man. The Cherokee were denied injunc-
tive relief. Id. at 1160.
133. Id. at 1162. Some commentators believe that the timing of the complaint doomed
its success. See, e~g., Pepper, The Conundrum of the Free Exercise Clause-Some Reflec-
tions on Recent Cases, 9 N. Ky. L. REV. 265, 278-79, 289 (1982); Suagee, American Indian
Religious Freedom and Cultural Resources Management: Protecting Mother Earth's Care-
takers, 10 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 54 (1982); Note, Native American Free Exercise Rights to
the Use of Public Lands, 63 B.U.L. REV. 141, 175-76 (1983). These comments confirm the
cost-as-outcome-determinative hypothesis discussed at supra notes 127-28 and accompany-
ing text.
134. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1162-63. For a detailed discussion of Cherokee religious
beliefs and of the importance of land in this religion, see, e.g., D. YWAHOO, VOICES OF OUR
ANCESTORS (1987) and C. HUDSON, ELEMENTS OF SOUTHEASTERN INDIAN RELIGION (1984).
135. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum at Exhibit D, Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979)(No. CIV 3-79-418)(affidavit of Ammoneta Sequoyah).
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with the origin of our organized religion."' 6 And another of the
plaintiffs, Richard Crowe, explained,
This land is sacred to me and my people, and it is hard for me to
talk about how I feel about this land. I have been going to the
lands at Tellico for many years, for at least more than thirty
years. Before I went myself, I used to hear my people, my par-
ents, speak of the land. My people referred to it in the Cherokee
language. They said di ga ta le no hr. This means, "This is where
WE began."'137
An anthropologist attempted to place these sentiments in a
Judeo-Christian context:
In short, to attempt to understand or maintain Cherokee religion
without access to known and significant sites in the "old country"
would be like attempting to understand and practice Judaism or
Christianity without the Book of Genesis. These sites represent
the ultimate foundation of Cherokee belief and practice, now, and
for the future. '38
During its discussion of the land in question, the court recognized
the relative prominence of nature and land in Cherokee religion,
specifically in terms of preserving the burial grounds of honored
ancestors and maintaining spiritual strength through kinship with
nature."'"
After establishing this factual context, the court considered
whether the Cherokee had demonstrated a "constitutionally cogni-
zable infringement of a first amendment right" under Sherbert
analysis. 40 Citing Yoder, 4 Woody,'4 and Frank v. State,'43 the
136. Id. (affidavit of Emmaline Driver (Oct. 10, 1979)).
137. Id. (affidavit of Richard Crowe (Oct. 7, 1979)).
138. Id. (affidavit of Prof. Albert L. Warhaftig (Oct. 8, 1979)).
139. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1162-63.
140. Id. at 1163. According to the decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972), the first step of the Sherbert test is evaluating the quality of the alleged religious
claim.
141. "[T]he religious faith and the mode of life of the Amish are 'inseparable and
interdependent,' and . . . 'the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of
personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and
intimately related to daily living.'" Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164 (quoting Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16).
142. "[P]rohibition of the use of peyote results in a virtual inhibition of the practice of
defendants' religion. To forbid the use of peyote is to remove the theological heart of Peyot-
ism." Id. at 1164 (citing People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 722, 394 P.2d 813, 817-18, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 69, 73-74 (1964)).
143. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979). The Sequoyah court cited Frank for the proposition
that an Indian may violate a state prohibition against killing moose, because the "[m]oose is
the centerpiece of the most important ritual in Athabascan life and is the equivalent of
sacred symbols in other religions." Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164.
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court reasoned that for the Cherokee to have a cognizable claim,
the alleged sacred site must be central or indispensable to Chero-
kee religious observances. " '
This centrality doctrine has come under heavy criticism, both
for being ethnocentric' 5 and a misconstruction of the cases from
which it draws its inspiration.'4 Indians do not divide the world
into the religious and the profane. Rather, they live a spiritually
informed existence. Within such an existence, separating the reli-
gious from the non-religious is impossible; similarly, separating the
centrally religious from the merely tangentially religious is foreign
to the structure of Indian thought. Hence, nothing is pervasively
religious because all is religious. And although Native Americans
do maintain some sort of hierarchial rankings within their religions
(with some land being sacred), they would never dismiss or dis-
count something for being merely tangentially religious. Applying
the centrality doctrine to Indian religious beliefs is blatantly eth-
nocentric, and precludes a true understanding of Native American
religions. Indeed, the very idea of a religious relationship between
a people and the land is foreign to Western thought, leading
"courts to attach central [religious] importance to practices that
are familiar or easily analogized to familiar practices' 4 7 and to re-
quire religions to conform to Judeo-Christian notions of mass or-
ganization and obediency to external authority.14 8
Not only is the centrality test plagued by ethnocentric limita-
tions, it is also based on a misconstruction of earlier case law. This
misconstruction and ethnocentrism, which together fueled the cen-
trality doctrine, are best illustrated by examining Wisconsin v.
Yoder. The claim raised in Yoder-the right of Amish children not
to submit to a compulsory school attendance law-is certainly no
more centrally religious than the claims of the Cherokee. 149 In
Yoder, the Court qualified the Amish claim as a religious right by
demonstrating that for the Amish, religion and lifestyle are "insep-
arable and interdependent.' 150 Do not Native Americans share a
similar Weltanschauung?
144. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164.
145. See, e.g., Petoskey, Indians and the First Amendment, in AMERICAN INDIAN POL-
ICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 221 (V. Deloria ed. 1985); Pepper, supra note 133, at 283-85;
Suagee, supra note 133, at 3-4; Note, supra note 131, at 1460-62.
146. See, e.g., Starnbor, Manifest Destiny and American Indian Religious Freedom:
Sequoyah, Badoni, and The Drowned Gods, 10 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 59, 68-70 (1982); Pepper,
supra note 133, at 282-83.
147. Note, supra note 131, at 1461.
148. Pepper, supra note 133, at 283.
149. Stambor, supra note 146, at 69.
150. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
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In order to forge a distinction between the beliefs of the
Amish and the beliefs of the Cherokee, the Sequoyah court seized
upon two differences between their cultures. Not surprisingly, each
distinction is rooted in Western prejudice. 51 First, the court con-
cluded "that worship at the particular geographic location in ques-
tion is [not] inseparable from the [Cherokee] way of life," as was
the "faith and mode of life of the Amish. ' ' 152 In essence, then, the
court delegitimizes the Cherokee claims by distancing the Chero-
kee identities from the land in question. Given that this distance,
if extant at all, is the result of an historical assault on Indian cul-
ture, the court is adding insult to injury and rejoicing in a cynical
version of winner's history.153 Second, the court discounts the affi-
davits submitted by the Cherokee plaintiffs 1 5  because they "ap-
pear to demonstrate 'personal preference' rather than convictions
'shared by an organized group.' "155 Here, the court's Judeo-Chris-
tian assumptions of what constitutes a valid religion prevent the
court from understanding the religious nature of the Cherokee
claims. If Western ideas of what should constitute a religion did
not restrict the court, the judges might have realized that to be
valid, a religion does not have to be characterized by organized
mass worship. Rather, the court would have seen that religion can
be simultaneously shared by a group while individualized in
experience.
Misconstruction of precedent was not limited to the Sequoyah
court's interpretation of Yoder. Woody and Frank were also mis-
construed to develop the centrality doctrine. The Sequoyah court's
reliance on Woody to derive the centrality test betrayed the
151. Commenting on this phenomenon of "approved" versus "non-approved" minori-
ties, one anthropologist explained,
The experience of the Amish is one example of the way a subculture is toler-
ated by the larger culture within which it functions. As different as they are, the
Amish actually practice many values that our nation respects in the abstract;
thrift, hard work, independence, a close family life. The degree of tolerance ac-
corded to them may also be due in part to the fact that the Amish are white
Europeans, of the same race as the dominant culture. American Indian subcul-
tures have been treated differently by whites. There was a racial difference; the
whites came as conquerors, and Indian values were not as easily understood or
sympathized with by the larger culture. The nation was less willing to tolerate the
differences of the Indians, with results that are both a matter of history, as well as
very much a current concern.
W. HAVILAND, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 31-32 (3d ed. 1981).
152. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980).
153. For similar analyses, see Pepper, supra note 133, at 287-88, and Stambor, supra
note 146, at 69.
154. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
155. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216).
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Woody court's effort to understand the religious beliefs of Native
Americans. When this yearning to understand and protect Indians'
free exercise rights is recognized as the operative force in Woody,
it becomes clear that Woody does not contain a centrality
requirement.
Similarly, Frank, while emphasizing that moose meat is the
centerpiece of a sacred Athabascan ritual, did not require central-
ity to gain first amendment protection. Indeed, Frank expressly
declared that
absolute necessity is a standard stricter than that which the law
imposes. It is sufficient that the practice be deeply rooted in reli-
gious belief to bring it within the ambit of the free exercise clause
and place on the state its burden of justification. The determina-
tion of religious orthodoxy is not the business of a secular
court.156
In light of such language, deriving the centrality doctrine from
Frank is spurious at best. Needless to say, the court did not find
the requisite centrality in Sequoyah, positing that even though the
Cherokee will suffer irreversible loss of cultural history and tradi-
tion, the religious essence protected by the first amendment is not
present.6 ' This apologetic attempt to distinguish between Indian
religion and Indian culture exposed the court's misunderstanding
of Indian religious beliefs, 18 just as the assertion of Indians' free-
dom of religion in the courts has revealed the ethnocentric bond-
age of judges and first amendment jurisprudence.
In reaction to the newly created centrality doctrine, a dissent
suggested that in fairness to the Cherokee, the Indians should have
the opportunity to demonstrate the centrality of the now flooded
land to their religion, rather than the majority's approach of devel-
oping a new doctrine and then deciding that the Indians did not
satisfy the tests of this doctrine. 159 Perhaps, this dissent radiates a
glimmer of insight into the religious beliefs of Indians. This glim-
mer shines brighter when it is viewed in contrast to the cultural
blindness of the majority that forced the judges to perceive the
essence of the Cherokee beliefs as merely tangential concerns '6
156. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1072-73 (Alaska 1979) (citations omitted).
157. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1165.
158. One commentator insightfully noted that "[sluch a division [between culture and
religion] contradicts the plaintiffs' testimony about how they understand their own reli-
gion." Pemberton, I Saw That It Was Holy: The Black Hills and the Concept of Sacred
Land, 3 L. & INEQUALITY 287, 317 (1985).
159. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1165 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
160. Others have understood that the Cherokee satisfied the centrality test, in spite of
its ethnocentric underpinnings. See Pemberton, supra note 158, at 317; Stambor, supra note
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and to impose the Western distinction between culture and reli-
gion on a group that historically has not recognized such a
distinction.
3. The Application of the Centrality Test to Subsequent Cases
Sequoyah was the first of several decisions in the early 1980s
abridging the free exercise rights of Indians. In Badoni v. Higgin-
son,16" ' Navajo religious leaders claimed that the government's im-
pounding of water to form Lake Powell in Utah, and the subse-
quent use of the lake to ferry tourists to view the Rainbow Bridge
National Monument, violated the Navajo's free exercise of religion
because the lake covered land sacred to the Navajo and the flood
of tourists desecrated the sacred nature of the sight and interfered
with the Navajo ceremonies conducted at the monument.
To the Navajo, the Glen Canyon area is home to many gods.
According to Navajo beliefs, these gods inhabit rock formations
and the walls in the canyon, and it is the gods who are responsible
for influencing many central aspects of Navajo life, including rain-
fall, health, and luck in dealing with the government. To entice the
gods, the Navajo frequently left ceremonial offerings at various lo-
cations in the canyon, including the foot of Rainbow Bridge. 62
The court accepted the validity-the centrality of the site to
Navajo religion-of the Indians' claim. 6' Under the Sherbert
calculus, however, the court decided that maintaining Lake Powell
at an intrusive level was a compelling state interest, given the im-
portance of this level in servicing the water needs of several West-
ern states.' 6' As for restricting tourism, the court concluded that
such regulation would clearly violate the establishment clause, rea-
soning that the Navajo were unreasonably requesting the govern-
ment to ensure privacy during the exercise of their first amend-
ment rights. 6 5 Lying behind each of these conclusions was the
146, at 68-72; Note, supra note 133, at 165-67.
161. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
162. See K. LUCKERT, NAVAJO MOUNTAIN AND RAINBOW BRIDGE RELIGION (1977). See
also G. REICHARD, NAVAJO RELIGION: A STUDY OF SYMBOLISM (1950) and S. GILL, SACRED
WORDS: A STUDY OF NAVAJO RELIGION AND PRAYER (1981) for general discussions of Navajo
religious beliefs.
163. "Rainbow Bridge and a nearby spring, prayer spot and cave have held positions
of central importance in the religion of some Navajo people living in the area for at least 100
years." Badoni, 638 F.2d at 177.
164. Id. at 178.
165. The invocation of the establishment clause in Badoni appears to be yet another
doctrinal disguise to mask the ethnocentric cost analysis that lies behind sacred site deci-
sions. Other commentators have suggested such a dynamic, attacking Badoni for simplisti-
cally holding that facilitating the Navajo free exercise rights would violate the establishment
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unstated premise that, unlike mainstream religions, Indians are re-
questing first amendment protection of a religious site that hap-
pens to be on public land, and this location justifies the infringe-
ment upon the Navajo's religious freedom. At least with regard to
its Sherbert calculus, the court can be commended for not trying
to hide its one-dimensional-focus-on-costs (i.e., reduction of the
water supply that the Indians' request would necessitate) free ex-
ercise jurisprudence.
Perhaps, the court brought this reasoning to the fore because
it needed to explain candidly why it was denying the free exercise
of what the court itself recognized as a constitutionally protected
religion. By displaying such candor, the Badoni court appears less
hypocritical than courts that deny sacred site claims on the
grounds that Indians' free exercise rights are not being abridged.
Yet, the Badoni court should not be applauded. Despite recogniz-
ing that the Navajo were expressing a constitutionally cognizable
religion, the court failed to explore the implications behind the un-
stated premise that, since the Navajo were requesting first amend-
ment protection of a religious site that was on public land, this
public location justified the infringement of the Indians' first
amendment rights. More pointedly, the court did not explore the
history that created this circumstance. Thus, even when courts do
evidence candor, neither justice nor the free exercise rights of
American Indians necessarily follow.
Fools Crow v. Gullet166 also involved the conversion of a sa-
cred site into a tourist attraction. The case arose when traditional
chiefs and spiritual leaders of the Lakota and Cheyenne Indians
sued South Dakota for transforming Bear Butte, "the most signifi-
cant site of Lakota religious ceremonies, "'7 into a state park with
its attendant features of roads, bridges, parking lots and tourists.
clause.
Under current doctrine this holding is almost bizarre: government may favor
religion (1) with property tax exemptions; (2) by mandating that children be con-
fined in school, and then, on a solely religious basis, releasing some students for
religious study; and (3) allowing some children on a solely religious basis to avoid
mandatory schooling to which all others must submit. Certainly these are more
substantial accommodations, or "establishments," than the relief requested by the
Navajo in relation to Rainbow Bridge.
Pepper, supra note 133, at 292 (citations omitted). See also Stambor, supra note 146, at 78-
.80, for an additional showing that Badoni involved a misapplication of the establishment
clause.
166. 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 977 (1983).
167. Id. at 788. See, e.g., BLACK ELK, THE SACRED PIPE (Joseph Epes Brown ed. 1971)
for a general discussion of Lakota religious beliefs.
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[Bear Butte] is -the holiest place in all the world for here
Ma'heo'o, the All-Father Creator Himself, gave Ma'aho'tse, the
Sacred Arrows, to Sweet Medicine the Prophet. From that day
on, the Cheyenne have been Ma'heo'o's own chosen, -called-out
people, the People. An endless stream of sacred power flows from
the Creator's Lodge within the Holy Mountain, blessing His Peo-
ple, giving them abundant power for new life.168
Both the Lakota and Cheyenne continue to conduct one of
their most important religious ceremonies on the butte; here they
endure the vision quest, a rite of isolation and deprivation, during
which an individual stays alone on the butte for several days and
fasts until he has a vision. The vision quest is a recurring religious
ceremony in the life of the Lakota and Cheyenne. Initially, the vi-
sion quest is a rite of passage. The individual's spirit guardian ap-
pears and shares its power with the vision seeker. An Indian's
name may reflect his spirit guardian, which usually takes an
animal form. Later vision quests provide revelations to deal with
trying times. While vision quests are pursued for various reasons
throughout an Indian's life, "the most important reason for 'la-
menting' is that it helps us to realize our oneness with all
things. "169
Fools Crow was triggered by further construction to facilitate
tourism in Bear Butte State Park. The Indians objected to the in-
terference that the construction process would create as well as the
results, particularly a proposed observation deck on the butte it-
self, increased pavement around the butte, and increased tourism
resulting from these developments. Regarding the proposed con-
struction, the court held that enjoining the plans would violate the
establishment clause.17 0 As for the tourists, the court agreed with
the Badoni court that excluding tourism from Bear Butte would
amount to a "government-managed religious shrine" and thus
would also violate the establishment clause."' Further, the court
felt that although the state-sponsored presence of tourism inter-
fered with the Lakota religious ceremonies, it did not prevent the
free exercise of religion, since the ceremonies could still be con-
168. P. POWELL, PEOPLE OF THE SACRED MOUNTAINS 2 (1981) (providing a general dis-
cussion of Cheyenne religion).
169. BLACK ELK, supra note 167, at 46.
170. "[Wle conclude that the free exercise clause places a duty upon a state to keep
from prohibiting religious [activities], not to provide the means or environment for carrying
them out." Fools Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 791 (citation omitted).
171. Id. at 792 (quoting Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980)).
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ducted despite the presence of outsiders. 1 7 Finally, in response' to
the Lakota claims that the construction plans would temporarily
interfere with their religious ceremonies, the court concluded that
the state had compelling interests-administrative and environ-
mental-to justify this temporary abridgment.
In its conclusion, despite expressly recognizing the unparal-
leled significance of Bear Butte to Lakota and Cheyenne religious
practices, the court reached the peculiar holding "that plaintiffs
failed to establish any infringement of a constitutionally cognizable
first amendment right," and that any temporary infringement on
the Indian religious ceremonies was outweighed by compelling
state interests in preserving this "historical landmark.' 1 73 So, in
the same paragraph, the court stated that the Lakota and Chey-
enne had not shown any protected first amendment right (neces-
sary to trigger the Sherbert test), but then employed the Sherbert
balancing test rhetoric, which presupposes a cognizable constitu-
tional right, to justify the infringement on the Lakota and Chey-
enne religions. The court then justified the inconvenience that it
inflicted on the Indians by reciting the necessity of preserving Bear
Butte as a historic landmark, a landmark that has gained its signif-
icance from its prominence in and continuing importance to the
Lakota and Cheyenne religions.
Wilson v. Block 74 reiterated the Fools Crow reasoning that
while the proposed development of a ski area would interfere with
Indian religious practices, it would not prevent the practice and
therefore did not constitute an impermissible burden on religion.
For the Navajo and Hopi bringing this case, the San Francisco
Peaks in Arizona were the dominant geographical formation in
their lives. The Navajo consider the Peaks to be one of four sacred
mountains forming the boundaries of their homeland. In addition,
they regard the Peaks as a living deity and personify its attributes.
Medicine men retreat to the Peaks to gather herbs for ceremonial
use both on the Peaks and in healing rituals in their villages.
To the Hopi, the Peaks are the home of Kachinas, or spirit
beings, who are the Creator's means of communicating with
humans. During the fall and winter, the Kachinas live in the
172. Id. In response to this holding, Chief Spotted Eagle of the Lakota commented,
"Imagine if we flip things around, and we had Indian people dominating the Christian
churches. There would be signs on the church aisles saying 'Don't photograph the Chris-
tians.' We Indians would stroll in there with our popcorn and watch you practice your reli-
gion." Northern Sun News, Nov. 1984, at 6, col. 4, quoted in Pemberton, supra note 158, at
326 n.166.
173. Fools Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 794.
174. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1056 (1984).
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Peaks. During other months, these supernatural beings descend
into Hopi villages for a series of ceremonies. The Kachinas are re-
sponsible for bringing rain, sun, health, happiness, and other good
things to the life of the Hopi. The Hopi also revere the Peaks'
many natural shrines and gather herbs in the Peaks for use in reli-
gious ceremonies. 17 5
The religious significance of the Peaks area to the Navajo and
Hopi was undisputed. 176 Nonetheless, the court held that the pro-
posed ski development did not violate the Indians' freedom of reli-
gious belief or their free exercise rights.1 77 According to the court,
in order to violate their freedom of religious belief, the government
would have to penalize the Indians' adherence to a religious
faith. T17  To address the free exercise claim, the court adopted a
modified version of the Sequoyah1 79 centrality test, requiring that
in order to justify first amendment protection, the Indians must
demonstrate that the site was "indispensable to some religious
practice, whether or not central to their religion."180 Under this
trumped-up centrality test, the court decided that while the San
Francisco Peaks were indispensable to Hopi and Navajo religious
practices, the indispensability of the specific site in question had
not been demonstrated. Because the remaining Peaks area is avail-
able for the practice of Hopi and Navajo religion, the Court rea-
soned that the Indians' religious practices, like their religious be-
liefs, have not been burdened. 181 Consequently, the Court
concluded that the compelling state interest factor of the Sherbert
test need not be considered. Considering that the Sequoyah and
Fools Crow courts reached similar conclusions, it appears that a
frequent consequence of the centrality test is an avoidance of
Sherbert analysis.
4. Ethnocentrism, Cost Analysis, and Sacred Site Decisions
The Wilson court, like the courts in Sequoyah, Badoni and
Fools Crow, failed to appreciate the spiritual and ecologically-
based nature of Native American religions.182 This failure stems
175. Id. at 738.
176. See generally M. SEVILLANO, THE Hopi WAY (1986) for a discussion of the religious
beliefs of the Hopi. For similar discussions regarding the Navajo, see authorities cited in
supra note 162.
177. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 741.
178. Id.
179. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
180. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 743.
181. Id. at 741.
182. A similar criticism can be levied at the court in Inupiat Community v. United
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from our society's cultural inability to understand the nature of a
non-Western culture's religious beliefs. Yet, as suggested earlier,
perhaps this failure stems from a more pragmatic and utilitarian
dynamic. Our society, vis-a-vis the courts, will indulge Native
American religions when the costs to the government are minimal.
Consequently, peyote use by one individual or by a discrete (both
in terms of numbers and social isolation) minority is a minor sacri-
fice that can be indulged under the banner of freedom of religion.
Yet when the costs of preserving religious freedom are greater,
such as is the case with injunctions that permanently ban land de-
velopment, neither courts nor legislatures will protect Native
Americans' free exercise rights. 183 Maybe this cryptic cost-benefit
analysis is not denied by first amendment jurisprudence: that is,
perhaps the Sherbert balancing test is doctrinal proof that cost-
benefit analysis does inform first amendment jurisprudence and
that Native Americans' religious liberty must succumb to the gov-
ernment's property interests.
However, in Sequoyah, Fools Crow and Wilson (every sacred
site case but one), the appellate courts have not found the requi-
site burden on religion to trigger the balancing test developed in
Sherbert,18 4 so the cost-benefit analysis that Sherbert entails is fre-
quently not a part of sacred site jurisprudence. Nonetheless, a
cost-benefit analysis is operative in sacred site jurisprudence.
When courts fail to appreciate Native American religions, the judi-
ciary has adopted the ethnocentric standards by which American
society generally evaluates the credibility of Native American reli-
gions. Implicit within this biased evaluation is a cost-benefit analy-
sis regarding the social value of the Indian religions. While this
States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982), aff'd, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 820 (1985), reh'g denied, 485 U.S. 972 (1988). "In essence, the Inupiats' claim that
their religious beliefs are inextricably inter-twined with their hunting and gathering life-
style"; thus, the court determined that a claim to such a large area of land on such non-
specific grounds cannot be constitutionally vindicated. Id. at 188-89.
183. Noticing this trend, a Yale Law Journal note argued that America is gripped by a
civil religion that worships progress and material prosperity. The note suggested that:
claims by Indians that development of public lands violates their religious beliefs
would seem at once obstructionist and counterproductive. In this land of great
freedom and republican virtues, this ideology argues, we must not allow regressive
attitudes-even religious ones-to get in the way of the greater good. Some excep-
tions are allowable, because they are relatively cost-free, but Indian free exercise
claims would require government to alter its understanding of its property rights
in public lands.
Note, supra note 131, at 1464.
184. This finding was particularly mystifying in Sequoyah where no religious burden
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cost-benefit analysis does not always determine the outcome of sa-
cred site cases, it enables judges to ignore the fundamental premise
of harmony with the land underlying all Native American religious
practice. It is the implicit presence of this cost-benefit analysis re-
garding what can functionally be considered a religion in Western
society that explains why judges recognize Indians' first amend-
ment right to use peyote but will refuse to extend first amendment
protection to sacred sites.
The refusal of judges to recognize sacred site claims as
presenting constitutionally valid religious questions is not purely a
consequence of the costs of protecting sacred sites. The interplay
between the judiciary's refusal and the anti-development implica-
tions of Native American religions is more subtle. In essence, the
judiciary is being asked to comprehend religions that defy Western
notions of both religion and, maybe more importantly, land usage.
These religions are so fundamentally foreign to Western values
that many judges are simply unable to appreciate them. This in-
ability stems from limitations upon Western thought, which make
it impossible for some individuals to appreciate the existence of
non-Western views of land. Because some Westerners are so rooted
to the notion of land as real estate, they can never shed their
Western Weltanschauung. And it is because of this inability that,
within the judiciary's refusal to protect Native American religions,
there exists an implicit cost-benefit analysis regarding the func-
tional viability of protecting sacred sites from development.
5. A Glimmer of Understanding
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peter-
son 185 may be to sacred site litigation what Woody is to peyote
use-a seminal case in which a court was able to overcome cultural
biases and recognize the religious rights of American Indians. The
case arose when Yurok, Karok and Tolowa Indians raised a sacred
site objection"8 6 to the National Forest Service's plans to construct
a paved road through an area of the Six Rivers National Forest in
California. Using the centrality test, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that the Forest Service's proposals would in-
terfere with the Indians' free exercise rights.18 7 After reaching this
185. 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nor. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
186. For a discussion of the religious importance of this area to these Indians, see
infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text. See, e.g., A. KROEBER, YUROK MYTHS (1976), for a
general discussion of the religious beliefs and practices of these culturally similar tribes.
187. Peterson, 795 F.2d at 692. In reaching this decision, the court expressly rejected
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conclusion, the court weighed the burden on the Indians' religion
against the compelling state interests justifying this interference,
holding that the government fell far short of proving persuasive
interests. 188 Thus, for the first time, an appellate court granted
first amendment protection to a sacred site religious claim.'89
6. The Supreme Court Considers Sacred Site Claims
a. Justice O'Connor's Majority Opinion
In a five-to-three split, the United States Supreme Court, in
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,'9 e
overturned the Ninth Circuit's precedent-breaking decision.
Rather than focusing on preserving the sites of the Indians' reli-
gious worship from government interference, Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion emphasized that neither the proposed road nor
lumbering would force the plaintiffs to violate their religious be-
liefs or penalize them for their chosen religious activities.191 Of
course, Justice O'Connor ignored the fact that if the sacred lands
were desecrated, the Indians would no longer have a coherent reli-
gion in which to believe. 9 2 Apparently, destroying a religion does
not constitute coercion or penalty. Justice O'Connor stipulated
that such coercion or penalization was the requisite infringement
on free exercise rights necessary to trigger the Sherbert test. To
justify such a high threshold, Justice O'Connor explained that pro-
tecting the Indians' religious rights would severely cripple the gov-
ernment's ability to use "its land" as it saw fit.' Once again, em-
phasis upon the maximum costs that our Western society will
indulge to protect free exercise precluded consideration of Indian
religious rights-an interesting phenomenon considering that the
property that the government wants to. protect was once exclu-
sively the Indians' domain. It seems that every time a court finds
that a sacred site claim has not presented a cognizable first amend-
ment free exercise right, the "crippling" costs of recognizing this
the notion, which was decisive in Wilson, that the free exercise clause can be violated only if
the governmental activity penalizes an individual for his religious beliefs or practices.
188. Id. at 695.
189. Actually, the court was affirming the decision below. See Northwest Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (1983).
190. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). Joining Justice -O'Connor's majority opinion were Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Scalia. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun dissented. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the decision.
191. Id. at 451-53.
192. For a discussion of the destructive effect of developing sacred land, see supra
note 23 and accompanying text.
193. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
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right lurk behind this determination. In other words, rights will
trump utility, but only when the result is utilitarian.
To support its holding, the majority equated the American In-
dians' sacred site claim to the claim raised in Bowen v. Roy,19 4
from which the Court adopted the coercion or penalty standard.
The cynical might suggest that this analogy explains why the
Court habitually denied certiorari to Native American first amend-
ment religious claims. Perhaps, the High Court was waiting for a
rather singular and obscure religious assertion, such as the one
that accepting a numerical representation would rob a two-year-
old Indian of her spirituality, in which to develop the doctrine for
resolving Indian free exercise issues. Once developed, this doctrine
could then be applied to more conventional and appreciable reli-
gious claims, such as the sacred land claim at issue in Lyng.
Even if this was not the Court's strategy, the majority's admit-
ted inability to distinguish the claim in Roy from the claim in
Lyng clearly exposed the prejudice that taints the Court's analysis.
If the Court had appreciated the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa claims
in Lyng, the Court would have recognized the religious relationship
that Native Americans share with their sacred lands. Certainly,
these relationships, which are central to the identities of many Na-
tive Americans, are distinguishable from one Indian's singular and
obscure claim that a social security number robs his daughter of
her spirit. As an afterthought possibly designed to dissuade criti-
cism, and to defend the Court's inability to distinguish the claims
in Lyng from those in Roy, Justice O'Connor stipulated: "Nothing
in our opinion should be read to encourage governmental insensi-
tivity to the religious needs of any citizen. ' ' 9e5 Given the historical
insensitivity of our society to Indians' religious rights and Lyng's
reflection and perpetuation of this insensitivity, Justice O'Connor's
apology amounts to an attempt by the Court to hide its continuing
failure to appreciate Indians' religious rights behind the veil of ju-
dicial restraint.
b. Justice Brennan's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan recognized the
Court's perpetuation of this history. Doctrinally, Justice Brennan
disagreed with the majority's requirement that in order to violate
the free exercise clause, the government must either coerce indi-
194. 476 U.S. 693 (1986)(accepting a social security number would not interfere with
the Indian plaintiffs' two-year-old daughter's religious beliefs). See supra note 72 and ac-
companying text.
195. Lyng, 485 U.S. at .453.
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viduals into violating their religious beliefs or penalize them for
their chosen religious activity. 196 Justice Brennan maintained that
this interpretation of the first amendment was flawed because it
"essentially leaves Native Americans with absolutely no constitu-
tional protection against perhaps the gravest threat to their reli-
gious practices. 1 97 Adopting a less stringent criterion, Justice
Brennan suggested that a "substantial threat" test should frame
the doctrinal analysis. s98 Under his formulation of the test, in order
to successfully bring a sacred site claim Indians would have to
demonstrate that the proposed use of the public land "poses a sub-
stantial and realistic threat of frustrating their religious prac-
tices."' 9 9 Justice Brennan felt that the Indian claimants met this
standard, but before he reached this conclusion he carefully re-
flected on the nature of the Yurok, Karok and Tolowa claims spe-
cifically, and on American Indian religions generally.
Justice Brennan respected the finding of the Forest Service's
commissioned study that, "for Native Americans[,] religion is not a
discrete sphere of activity separate from all others, and any at-
tempt to isolate the religious aspects of Indian life 'is in reality an
exercise which forces Indian concepts into non-Indian catego-
ries.' "200 Justice Brennan continued his review of American Indi-
ans' religions, noting that a "pervasive feature of this lifestyle is
the individual's relationship with the [land]; this relationship,
which can accurately though somewhat incompletely be character-
ized as one of stewardship, forms the core of what might be called,
for want of a better nomenclature, the Indian religious experi-
ence."20' Because of their non-Western-based conception of land,
Justice Brennan realized that Indian religions cannot be under-
stood within Judeo-Christian frameworks: "Where dogma lies at
the heart of western religions, Native American faith is inextrica-
bly bound to the use of land. The site-specific nature of Indian
religious practice derives from the Native American perception
that land is itself a sacred, living being. "202
For the Yurok, Karok and Tolowa, this was why the land at
issue in Lyng was important to their culture. For these people, the
high country was the most sacred of land: when humans appeared
196. Id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 475.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 459 (citing D. THEODORATUS, CULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE CHIMNEY ROCK
SECTION, GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, Six RIVERs NATIONAL FOREST (1979)).
201. Id. at 460.
202. Id. at 460-61.
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on Earth, the spirits who formerly dwelled in the lowlands had
moved to and continue to live in this high country. Because of the
spirits' presence, the high country is believed to contain many me-
dicinal powers, both in the form of herbs as well as in the form of
geological formations.
Nonetheless, under the majority's doctrinal formulation, it was
insignificant as a constitutional matter that the proposed road and
lumbering would interfere with the high country's sanctity for the
Indians, and perhaps destroy their religion in the process. Without
the requisite coercion or penalization, the majority considered the
intrusion on the Indians' religious life constitutionally negligible.
Justice Brennan attacked the majority's distinction between the
non-constitutional harm suffered by the Indians and the Constitu-
tion's protection against coercion or penalty as a distinction "with-
out constitutional significance. 20 3 Justice Brennan was similarly
annoyed by the majority's reliance on Bowen v. Roy, finding the
majority's inability to distinguish the claimants' sacred site claim
from that raised in Roy "altogether remarkable. 2 0 4 Finally, Justice
Brennan recognized the one-dimensional cost-benefit analysis that
dictates sacred site decisions. 0 5 Justice Brennan understood that
this one-dimensional analysis is the judiciary's contribution to the
on-going saga of systematically denying Indians' rights.
[T]he Court's refusal to recognize the constitutional dimension of
respondents' injuries stems from its concern that acceptance of
respondents' claim could potentially strip the Government of its
ability to manage and use vast tracts of federal property....
These concededly legitimate concerns lie at the very heart of this
case, which represents yet another stress point in the longstand-
ing conflict between two disparate cultures .... 201
Justice Brennan chastised the majority for refusing to con-
front this cultural conflict and pointed out that, by defining the
Indians' injury as non-constitutional, the majority had ensured
that the government would always win any future conflicts be-
tween land development and Indian sacred site claims.
Rather than address this conflict in any meaningful fashion, how-
ever, the Court disclaims all responsibility for balancing these
competing and potentially irreconcilable interests, choosing in-
stead to turn this difficult task over to the Federal Legislature.
203. Id. at 468.
204. Id. at 470. For similar sentiments, see comments in this article at supra notes 72,
93-94 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
206. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 473.
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Such an abdication is more than merely indefensible as an insti-
tutional matter: by defining respondents' injury as "non-constitu-
tional," the Court has effectively bestowed on one party to this
conflict the unilateral authority to resolve all future disputes in
its favor, subject only to the Court's toothless exhortation to be
"sensitive" to affected religions210
In contrast to such abdication, Justice Brennan felt the Court had
a responsibility to balance the government's need to manage and
use its vast property holdings against the Indians' free exercise
rights. As a result of feeling this judicial obligation, Justice Bren-
nan proposed his modified version of the centrality doctrine.
c. The Lessons of Justice Brennan's Dissent
While Justice Brennan's substantial threat test might some
day be an informative part of constitutional law, this doctrinal
contribution is not the most important aspect of his dissenting
opinion. Of greater value are two non-doctrinal aspects of his dis-
sent that try to bore through and expose the ethnocentrism cur-
rently plaguing sacred site jurisprudence.
Unlike many other judges, Justice Brennan actually seemed to
understand that Native American religions cannot be compre-
hended within Judeo-Christian concepts. As a result, he conveyed
a sense of the Weltanschauung of American Indians by detailing
the particular importance of the now-developed land to the Yurok,
Karok and Tolowa Indians specifically, and to Native Americans
generally. After making this anthropological leap of faith, Justice
Brennan confronted the difficulty of protecting such non-Western
religions in a legal and- jurisprudential system that operates on
Western assumptions.
Justice Brennan also attempted to conform the law to social
reality. The majority, on the other hand, lowered the veil of judi-
cial restraint in order to ignore the presence of persecuted non-
Western beliefs in our Western society. In doing so, the majority
allowed the law to perpetuate Western society's dominance in this
seemingly endless clash of cultures. The majority acknowledged its
contribution in perpetuating the suppression of Indian beliefs by
Justice O'Connor's throw-away line that, "Nothing in our opinion
should be read to encourage governmental insensitivity to the reli-
gious needs of any citizen. 2 0 *
Demanding judicial candor instead of the judicial abdication
207. Id.
208. Id. at 453.
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preferred by the majority, Justice Brennan understood that two
"concededly legitimate concerns lie at the very heart of this
case" 2°'-the government's property right in its land and the Indi-
ans' free exercise rights. He also understood that "the competing
claims that both the Government and Native Americans assert in
federal land are fundamentally incompatible. '"21 0 Rather than ig-
noring these realizations or refusing even to recognize the Native
Americans' constitutional interests in sacred sites, as courts have
repeatedly done and as the Supreme Court chose to do in Lyng,
Justice Brennan demanded that courts develop doctrine that flows
from these realizations. Unfortunately, as of yet, the courts, and
now it appears the law as settled by the Supreme Court, have not
even reached these realizations. This moment of recognition must
occur before courts confront the more difficult task of reconciling
these two fundamentally incompatible interests.
IV. A NEW TRADITION: A DOCTRINAL PROPOSAL FOR SACRED SITE
ANALYSIS
If the courts finally transcend their limited and Western-
rooted notions of religion, judges will begin to appreciate that de-
veloping "nature" destroys Native American religions. If this leap
of faith occurs, the judiciary will have to reconcile the fundamen-
tally incompatible claims that Native Americans and the govern-
ment assert over some public lands. Reconciling these conflicting
rights will require both free exercise .and establishment clause
analysis.
Bound by the predominant cultural ideology, judges will still
have to employ Western legal doctrines to protect American Indian
religious rights in light of a heightened awareness of the cultural
diversity within our society. And while there is an uneasy fit be-
tween Native American religions and Western legal doctrines, the
law is still capable of protecting these non-Western religions. In
doing so, not only will the law protect religions that it currently
inhibits, but it will also recognize the social reality of religious di-
versity in America. As the Woody court explained, protecting this
diversity is a benefit in itself.
[Tihe right to free religious expression embodies a precious heri-
tage of our history. In a mass society, which presses at every point
toward conformity, the protection of a self-expression, however
unique, of the individual and the group becomes ever more im-
209. Id. at 473.
210. Id. at 474.
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portant. The varying currents of the subcultures that flow into
the mainstream of our national life give it depth and beauty. We
preserve a greater value than an ancient tradition when we pro-
tect the rights of the Indians . ... "'
A. Free Exercise Analysis
While some commentators have suggested alternative doc-
trines for resolving sacred site claims,212 the substantial threat test
proposed by Justice Brennan can do justice to both Indian and
government claims. However, before this can occur, judges must
recognize that Native American religions are based on a spiritual
relationship that is particularly strong with certain undeveloped
lands. Although the centrality test is ethnocentric in that it im-
poses Western notions of religiosity on a non-Western religion,
perhaps the substantial threat test (admittedly a modification of
the centrality test) should be adopted for sacred site analysis.2"
Any doctrine that is devised and then applied to Native Americans
will be influenced by Western thought, but that does not mean
that it has to be discriminatory in impact. To achieve nondiscrimi-
nation, judges must rise above their Judeo-Christian notions of
what constitutes a religion and then apply a doctrine such as the
substantial threat test.
Some might argue that adopting Justice Brennan's approach is
tantamount to granting a Native American veto over any proposed
development of public land. This conjecture is without basis. In
order to meet the substantial 'threat test, Indian plaintiffs must
demonstrate that the proposed development "poses a substantial
and realistic threat of frustrating their religious practices."214 Such
211. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 727-28, 394 P.2d 813, 821-22, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69,
77-78 (1964).
212. See, e.g., Note, supra note 131, at 1466 n.90 (suggesting that Native American
religions should be protected under a public forum analysis); Note, supra note 5, at 885
(suggesting that a free exercise claim that comes under the rubric of the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act presumptively meets the burden of the first prong of the Sherbert
test); Comment, The Trust Doctrine: A Source of Protection for Native American Sacred
Sites, 38 CATH. U.L. REv. 705 (1989) (arguing that the trust relationship between the federal
government and American Indians requires the government to protect sacred sites). But see
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) and Badoni v.
Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), in which these district courts held that the
asserted free exercise claims could not supercede the government's property interest in fed-
eral lands. But see, also, the appellate court opinions that flatly rejected such an absolutist
approach. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980); Sequoyah v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1980).
213. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
214. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 475.
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a demonstration would require a marshalling of evidence, both his-
torical and contemporary, that-the land in question is of particular
significance to the plaintiffs. This burden would effectively prevent
abuse of the first amendment. Moreover, because the government
could still trump the Indians' free exercise rights by establishing a
compelling government interest to justify the proposed develop-
ment, the Native American right to limit government action is it-
self limited. This limitation on Native American free exercise
rights, a limitation that is imposed on all Americans, ensures that
the government property interests can be vindicated when
necessary.
Criticism has been levied at the centrality approach. In Smith,
Justice Scalia criticized this approach as unprincipled: "What prin-
ciple of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a be-
liever's assertion that a particular act is 'central' to his personal
faith? ' 215 Justice Scalia's steadfast refusal to recognize the appro-
priateness of using any form of centrality test to evaluate sacred
site claims parallels his refusal to recognize Native Americans' reli-
gious beliefs. Justice Scalia objects to a centrality test because he
is afraid of stepping onto a slippery slope: carried to their logical
extreme, American Indians' religious beliefs would raise objections
to almost all development of public land. The untenability of vin-
dicating such religious beliefs requires adopting either one of two
approaches: rejecting all such claims, which is the current practice,
or differentiating lands that are crucial to Indian religions from
those that are not. Without such a differentiation, and assuming
that development of public lands will continue, sacred site claims
will never be protected. Hence, if the free exercise rights of Native
Americans are to be protected, a centrality test is a necessary doc-
trine in sacred site jurisprudence.
B. Establishment Clause Analysis
In both Badoni and Fools Crow, the courts refused to protect
Native Americans' free exercise rights because the judges reasoned
that such accommodation would violate the establishment
clause.21 These conclusions highlight the tension between "the two
Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and ei-
ther of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash
with the other. ' 217 The tension between the free exercise clause
215. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1604
(1990).
216. See supra notes 165 and 171 and accompanying text.
217. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) (tax exemption of churches is
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and the establishment clause has received much attention and fre-
quent attempts are made to reconcile these doctrines." 8
Despite this tension, accommodating the free exercise rights of
Indian plaintiffs by not developing sacred lands is not an unconsti-
tutional establishment of religion. The Supreme Court has held
that exemptions from school attendance requirements '19 and from
taxation 220 do not violate the establishment clause. In Sherbert,
the Court required the state to make unemployment benefits avail-
able to a Seventh-Day Adventist who for religious reasons could
not work on Saturday and hence was unemployed.22" ' Similarly, in
Thomas v. Review Board,222 the state was required to supply un-
employment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who quit his job in a
weapons plant based on his religious convictions. In other in-
stances, as well, the Court has accommodated religions in order to
vindicate free exercise rights.
Professor Laurence Tribe has concluded "that the free exer-
cise principle should be dominant when it conflicts with the anti-
establishment principle. Such dominance is the natural result of
tolerating religion as broadly as possible rather than thwarting at
all costs even the faintest appearance of establishment. '22 3 Individ-
ual justices have recognized the inevitability of accommodating re-
ligions in the pursuit of free exercise protection.224 Such a prefer-
ence for free exercise accommodation is particularly appropriate in
the context of sacred site claims: without free exercise protection,
the basis of the Native American religions-their immemorial rela-
tionships with particular lands-will be destroyed. Moreover, "gov-
ernment efforts to remedy a burden it has placed [or threatens to
not equivalent to government sponsorship).
218. See, e.g., McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Com-
ment, A Non-Conflict Approach to the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 1175 (1983).
219. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 n.22 (1972) ("The purpose and effect of
[exemptions for Amish school children] are not to support, favor, advance, or assist the
Amish, but to allow their centuries-old religious society ... to survive ....
220. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
221. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
222. 450 U.S. 707 .(1981). See McConnell, supra note 218, for other instances of reli-
gious accommodation.
223. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1201 (1988).
224. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 247 (1963)(Brennan, J., concur-
ring) ("[Tihe logical interrelationship between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
may produce situations where an injunction against an apparent establishment must be
withheld in order to avoid infringement of rights of free exercise."). Similarly, Justice
O'Connor noted in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985), "[iut is disingenuous to look
for a purely secular purpose when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate the free
exercise of religion ...."
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place] on the free exercise of a 'minority' religion cannot realisti-
cally be viewed as having the purpose or primary effect of attempt-
ing to establish religion. 225
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Supreme Court's rejection of the Indians' claims in Lyng
has robbed Indians and their sacred sites of the first amendment
free exercise protection that they deserve. Justice Scalia's rework-
ing of free exercise jurisprudence in Smith indicates that Native
Americans should abandon efforts at convincing federal courts to
preserve their sacred sites from destructive development; no mat-
ter what the legal arguments proffered, it is unlikely that Indian
plaintiffs will be able to demonstrate that the government's moti-
vating purpose in desecrating a sacred site was to deny Indians
their religious rights. Ironically, in the process of announcing this
new standard, Justice Scalia suggested one of the two avenues that
Native Americans can take to protect their religious rights.
According to Justice Scalia, minority religions should rely on
the political process to safeguard their religious practice.228 From
one perspective, Justice Scalia's suggestion adds insult to injury,
given the dominant culture's historic treatment of American Indi-
ans. On the other hand, because it is clear that the Supreme Court
does not view the first amendment as protecting the sacred sites of
Native Americans, Indians are now forced to engage in democratic
politics.
As has been demonstrated in some states that have protected
peyote use within the Native American Church, lobbying efforts
can be successful. Yet, as the substantively neuter American In-
dian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 illustrates, even legislative ac-
tion does not ensure actual freedoms. In 1989, Congress introduced
several bills227 to amend the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act of 1978. These proposed amendments were intended to ensure
that the government only desecrate sacred sites in instances of
225. Comment, supra note 218, at 1179.
226. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606
(1990).
In referring to the Smith and Lyng decisions, a tribal attorney emphasized the need for
focusing on legislative action: "The Supreme Court has trampled on the Tribes' first amend-
ment religious freedom rights, thus forcing us to shift the forum not only to Congress but
also to state legislatures." Pat Smith, Attorney for Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes, Remarks at the Natural Resource Management in Indian Country Workshop, 13th
Annual Public Land Law Conference, Missoula, Mont. (Apr. 25, 1991).
227. S. 1124, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 1979, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R.
1546, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
1991]
57
Rhodes: AN AMERICAN TRADITION: THE RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION OF NATIVE AMERICANS
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1991
MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
manifest necessity. These bills never made it to the floor of Con-
gress. Currently, efforts are underway to reintroduce similar
legislation.
In the meantime, rather than relying exclusively on the federal
government and federal judiciary to protect their religious rights,
Native Americans should pursue protection elsewhere. Despite the
application of such doctrines as aboriginal rights,2 tribal sover-
eignty, 29 fiduciary relationship between guardian and ward,23 0 and
now first amendment free exercise, 31 for decades Indians have
continued to lose ground in their struggle not only to keep their
land, but even to maintain their cultural identities. Throughout
the periods in history when acknowledged federal policy was as-
similation of the Indians into mainstream American life and con-
tinuing into the period when federal policy has supported tribal
self-determination,3 2 the Supreme Court has been a protector of
tribal autonomy and Native American culture.23 Smith, construed
in conjunction with other recent opinions,23' signals the current
228. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (Chief Justice Marshall dis-
tinguishing between title to land acquired by conquest and force and aboriginal right of
occupancy). The Court reiterated Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning 60 years later in
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
229. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (seminal case establishing Indi-
ans' right to self-government within their designated land).
230. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (Chief Justice Marshall
identified Indian tribes as "domestic dependant nations .... Their relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian."). See also Kagama, 118 U.S. at 382.
231. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, reh'g
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2605 (1990). Invoking the U.S. Constitution is a fairly recent development
in asserting Indian rights. The Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 spurred litigation in-
voking free exercise rights because the Act declared it was national policy to protect Indian
free exercise rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988) ("it shall be the policy of the United States
to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe,
express, and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian ... including but not
limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects....").
232. The General Allotment Act of 1887, also known as the Dawes Act, resulted in the
opening of many reservations to settlement by non-Indians. Allotment officially ended with
passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1988)).
233. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd mern., 484
U.S. 997 (1988). White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Fisher v.
District Court, 424 U.S. 382, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 926 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971);
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Ex
parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
234. In 1978, the Supreme Court denied an Indian tribe criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians on the reservation. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). In
1990, the Court diminished the tribal jurisdiction further by denying criminal jurisdiction
over "non-member" Indians on the reservation. Duro v..Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990). How-
ever, by amending the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, the House of Representatives has
delayed the effect of the Duro decision until September 30, 1991 in order to give Congress
further opportunity to consider this issue. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of
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High Court's abandonment of its traditional role in protecting a
discrete minority from the oppression of the majority culture.
Historically, state governments have been in conflict with In-
dians, who have had to depend upon the federal government (and
most particularly, the Supreme Court) for protection from state
encroachment upon their lands and their rights. This conflict ex-
ists today. However, as the peyote-use statutes demonstrate,2 3
5
there is evidence that the atmosphere in statehouses may be
changing and that educational efforts at the state and local levels
of government may produce results beneficial to Native Americans.
Raising the American public's awareness of the Indians' unique
culture, as well as their constitutional rights, is a necessary precur-
sor to overcoming their traditional prejudicial treatment by legisla-
tors and judges. When a sacred site is located on state land, both
state courts36 and legislatures can act to protect the religious prac-
tices of Native Americans. Moreover, by acting to preserve the reli-
gious rights, of American Indians, the states can assist both their
own citizens and federal judges and legislators in understanding
the Weltanschauung that shapes Native American religions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The clash of cultures between American Indians and the dom-
inant majority has been a part of America since its "discovery" by
Europeans. Historically, the United States has not dealt with this
clash very admirably. Rather than trying to understand the im-
pulses behind Indian behavior, our society has maintained atti-
tudes and policies that amount to a war of cultural genocide
against the American Indian. No aspect of this cultural attack has
been more damaging than the persistent denial of religious free-
dom for Native Americans. Wounded Knee, for all of its tragedy,
was merely one isolated example dramatically exposing our soci-
ety's relentless assault on Native American religions. Most of us
are ashamed and embarrassed by what happened in 1890.
1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (1991) (Duro v. Reina
amendment).
235. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
236. As Justice Brennan has convinced the legal world, the federal Constitution
merely establishes the minimum individual rights that states must respect; the states, on
the other hand, are free to expand and proliferate rights. See, e.g., Brennan, State Constitu-
tions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977). See also Note,
Crow Tribe v. Montana: New Limits on State Intrusion into Reservation Rights, New Les-
sons for State and Tribal Cooperation, 50 MONT. L. REv. 133 (1989) (authored by James R.
Bellis) (suggesting states and tribes should join forces to ward off federal domination of
both state and tribal natural resources).
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Despite this consensus, the current law does not recognize that
the prejudice that led to Wounded Knee persists today. Arguably,
its presence today is even more insidious than it was in 1890. Mow-
ing down Lakota men, women and children after they had peace-
fully agreed to travel with the Army is an obvious form of cultural
persecution. Legal doctrines that appear to be neutral and that cel-
ebrate the virtues of freedom of religion, yet which manage to deny
this freedom to American Indians are a more subtle and, hence,
more dangerous form of persecution. That Wounded Knee was a
regrettable event is undeniable. However, when prejudice is
cloaked in legal doctrine, sanctioned by prestigious institutions,
and manifest in cases of only marginal interest to mass society, the
continuing denial of Indian religious freedom can be easily over-
looked. We can no longer rely on the sensational clash between the
white man and the red man on the open grasses and rolling hills of
the Great Plains to illustrate the denial of Indian religious rights.
Rather, an understanding and appreciation of Native American re-
ligions within the legal system will have to serve this function to-
day. The legal system has yet to demonstrate its ability to achieve
such comprehension.
'Achieving this comprehension is the first, and crucial, step in
preserving the free exercise rights of Native Americans. Once
courts recognize that the Indians are presenting constitutionally
cognizable injuries, the judiciary must resolve the conflicting reli-
gious and property interests that Native Americans and the gov-
ernment, respectively, assert in some public lands. However, before
this can occur, judges must transcend the ethnocentrism that
Western culture inculcates in them. Until then, the judiciary and
the law, as currently settled by the Supreme Court in Lyng and
Smith, will continue to perpetuate the historical denial of Ameri-
can Indians' religious freedom.
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